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Challenging Payday Lenders by Opening up the 
Market for Small-Dollar Loans 
Eliza Platts-Mills and Justin Chung* 
ABSTRACT 
“Why hasn’t someone else stepped in to lend at lower interest 
rates?” is the question frequently asked in discussions of payday loans. 
The average payday loan carries an Annual Percentage Rate (APR) of 
over 300%. Given the strength of the payday lenders lobby at the fed-
eral and state level, one way to help low- and moderate-income house-
holds escape the financial harms of payday loans is to encourage other 
lenders to enter the small-dollar loan market and offer more affordable 
products. Over the past ten years, an array of affordable small-dollar 
loan programs offered by banks, credit unions, non-profit organiza-
tions, and for-profit fintech companies have entered the market to pro-
vide borrowers with alternatives to payday loans. These lenders are of-
fering small-dollar loans at rates and on terms that are more 
manageable for low- and moderate-income consumers than payday 
loans, while maintaining the features of payday loans that consumers 
like—namely quick and easy access to credit. 
 This paper will describe these affordable small-dollar loan pro-
grams and explain what is needed from regulators, financial institu-
tions and foundations, and consumer advocates for the programs to 
serve more borrowers and take over more of the market space cur-
rently occupied by payday lenders. Banks, with support from their 
regulators, can offer affordable small-dollar loans to their customers 
and should continue to provide low-interest loan capital to non-profit 
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small-dollar lenders. Credit unions can continue to offer small-dollar 
loan programs like the Payday Alternative Loan product and the Em-
ployer Sponsored Small-Dollar Loan product and should be encour-
aged to do so by their regulators. Non-profit organizations can con-
tinue to offer affordable loans in partnership with employers or other 
lenders and should be provided with grants and low-interest loan cap-
ital and pro-bono support from lawyers and marketing companies. 
For-profit, fintech lenders can continue to enter this space and should 
be supported by consumer advocates and regulators as long as their 
products meet certain guidelines: compliance with all federal and state 
laws, affordable payments, and features such as credit bureau report-
ing, transparent fees, and flexible repayment terms. Finally, recent ef-
forts in Congress to encourage the U.S. Postal Service to offer afford-
able small-dollar loans should also be supported. 
The short-term small-dollar credit needs of low- and moderate-
income households should not be met primarily by payday lenders 
whose high fees and short repayment terms too often trap borrowers 
in a cycle of debt. Low-and moderate-income consumers deserve bet-
ter options.  With support, the affordable small-dollar loan programs 
described in this paper can be expanded to make the market for small-
dollar credit more competitive, helping borrowers across the country. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Much has been written in the academic press and in the popular 
media about the urgent need for small-dollar loans for the large num-
ber of low- and moderate-income households that have trouble mak-
ing their income and expenses meet each month.1 Much has also been 
written about the harmful impact of payday loans.2 There is a vigorous 
debate among consumer advocates, industry players, and policy makers 
about whether state and federal regulations are needed to rein in pay-
day lending, or whether regulating payday loans would deny consum-
ers access to a critical source of credit.3 Far less has been written about 
the market alternatives to payday loans that are emerging, and the suc-
cesses that these lenders are having extending affordable small-dollar 
loans to low- and moderate-income borrowers.4 This article will de-
scribe some of the affordable small-dollar loan programs currently on 
the market and suggest ways for the public and private sectors to help 
expand these programs to reach and serve more consumers. 
 
 1. See e.g., Neil Bhutta et. al., Consumer Borrowing After Payday Loan Bans, 59 J.L. & 
ECON. 225, 226 (2016) (suggesting that the underlying cause of payday borrowing is a general 
demand for short-term credit rather than some feature unique to the design or marketing of 
payday loans); Gillian B. White, When Payday Loans Die, Something Else Is Going to Replace 
Them, ATLANTIC (Oct. 20, 2017),  https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/10/pay-
day-loan-occ/543453 (arguing that regulations to curb the supply of payday loans do not address 
the problem of consumers’ demand for small, fast, easy-to-obtain loans). 
 2. See, e.g., Shane M. Mendenhall, Payday Loans: The Effects of Predatory Lending on 
Society and the Need for More State and Federal Regulation, 32 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 299, 
306-15 (2007) (discussing how the payday loan industry targets poor and lower-middle-class fam-
ilies entrapping them in the “debt treadmill” and subjecting them to unfair and illegal collection 
practices); Emily Bazelon, How Payday Lenders Prey Upon the Poor — and the Courts Don’t 
Help, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/20/magazine/how-pay-
day-lenders-prey-upon-the-poor-and-the-courts-dont-help.html (describing how payday lend-
ers prey on the poor and the limits of judicial action against payday lenders). 
 3. See, e.g., Chris Cirillo, Payday Loan Regulation: Any Interest?, 11 DEPAUL BUS. & 
COMM. L.J. 417, 418 (2013) (“The federal regulations currently in place, combined with specific 
state regulations . . . can provide a beneficial and fair service to payday loan consumers if utilized 
in the intended manner”); Paige Marta Skiba, Regulation of Payday Loans: Misguided?, 69 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1023, 1026 (2012) (“Current forms of state and federal regulation of pay-
day lending are largely misguided . . . [M]ost current regulations that restrict access to payday 
loans do not increase consumers’ welfare.”). 
 4. But see Patrick L. Hayes, A Noose Around the Neck: Preventing Abusive Payday 
Lending Practices and Promoting Lower Cost Alternatives, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1134, 
1157-60 (2009) (discussing alternatives to payday loans offered by banks and credit unions); Mi-
chael Kenneth, Payday Lending: Can “Reputable” Banks End Cycles of Debt?, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 
659, 662 (2008) (evaluating potential alternatives to mitigate the effects of payday loans including 
credit unions and banks offering competing products). 
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This article will refer to the payday loans that emerged in the 1990s 
and that feature high fees, short terms, and frequent default and rollo-
ver as “payday loans” offered by “payday lenders.” This article will re-
fer to the lower-cost, longer-term, more affordable consumer loan al-
ternatives as “affordable small-dollar loans” offered by “affordable 
small-dollar loan programs.” The marketplace for both payday loans 
and affordable small-dollar loans will be described as the marketplace 
for “small-dollar loans.” 
Part II of this article explains why each year approximately twelve 
million low- and moderate-income households in the United States 
need small-dollar loans and turn to payday lenders. Part III provides a 
short description of payday loans and the serious financial harm they 
impose on many of their borrowers. Part IV highlights some of the 
affordable small-dollar loans currently available to consumers and ex-
plains the ways that these small-dollar loans meet some of the market 
demand described in Part II and avoid the problems described in Part 
III. Part V concludes with recommendations of specific ways that fi-
nancial institutions and foundations, regulators, and consumer advo-
cates can provide critical support to these affordable small-dollar loan 
programs and the low- and moderate-income borrowers they serve. 
Enabling low- and moderate-income households to access small-dollar 
loans on more affordable terms will lessen the financial burden these 
families struggle under and make their lives a little less stressful. 
II.  THE PERSISTENT NEED FOR SMALL-DOLLAR LOANS 
Small dollar loans fill an important market niche in the American 
economy. Each year, approximately twelve million Americans take out 
a payday loan. The majority of these payday loan borrowers report an-
nual household income between $15,000 and $50,000.5 All payday loan 
borrowers are required to have income, either from a job or from gov-
ernment benefits such as Social Security or disability benefits. Payday 
loan borrowers are also required to have a bank account, both to re-
ceive the loan principle and to repay the loan.6 While some borrowers 
 
 5. Nick Bourke, Alex Horowitz & Tara Roche, Payday Lending in America: Who Bor-
rows, Where They Borrow, and Why, 1 PEW CHARITABLE TR. 48, 35 (2012), 
https://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2012/pewpaydaylendingre-
portpdf.pdf. 
 6. Id. at 6 (“[Payday] loans are secured by a claim to the borrower’s bank account with a 
post-dated check or electronic debit authorization”). 
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use payday loans to cover unexpected, emergency situations, nearly 
70% of people who take out payday loans are using the money to cover 
their basic, monthly living expenses.7  
Most U.S. households are savings-limited, meaning that they do 
not have enough liquid assets to cover one month of their living ex-
penses; and the average, low-income household in the United States 
does not have enough cash or savings to cover even two weeks of its 
living expenses.8 One of the biggest financial challenges facing low-
income Americans is unpredictable changes in the amount and timing 
of their income resulting from irregular hours from employers.9 Al-
most all U.S. households encounter significant dips in income at some 
point, but families without savings and assets, and without access to a 
credit card, are not able to weather those ups and downs the same way 
families with savings, wealth, and credit cards can. 
There are three major reasons that low- and moderate-income 
households in America are unable to save and need regular access to 
small amounts of short-term credit: (1) flat and falling household in-
come; (2) high and increasing housing costs; and (3) systemic home-
ownership and credit discrimination against families of color.10 House-
hold income is not keeping pace with living expenses (particularly 
housing costs)—contributing factors include employees lacking the 
necessary education, skills, drive, and support systems to find good 
jobs, and employers failing to provide enough regular hours at livable 
wages.11 The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) estimates that 8.15 million renter and homeowner households 
in America pay more than 50% of their income on housing, almost two 
 
 7. Id. at 13. 
 8. Erin Currier et al., The Precarious State of Family Balance Sheets, 1 PEW 
CHARITABLE TR. 22, 10 (2015),  https://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2015/01/fsm_balan
ce_sheet_report.pdf. 
 9. Aaron Klein, Understanding Non-Prime Borrowers and the Need to Regulate Small-
Dollar and “Payday” Loans, BROOKINGS (May 19, 2016),  https://www.brookings.edu/research 
/understanding-non-prime-borrowers-and-the-need-to-regulate-small-dollar-and-payday-loan 
s/ (citing research from the Center for Financial Strategy Innovation showing income fluctua-
tions as high as 25% below average for almost three months of the year); see also, Noam 
Scheiber,  Marriott Workers Struggle to Pay Bills, and Credit Union Fees,  N.Y.  TIMES  (Oct. 
11, 2018), https://tinyurl.com/y9rjyecf (describing Marriott’s failure to give its employees full 
hours). 
 10. Currier, supra note 8, at 2–3, 6–7; RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A 
FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA 59–76, 153–76 (2017). 
 11. See generally Klein, supra note 9; Currier, supra note 8, at 2–3, 6–7. 
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times the 30% of income that HUD considers “affordable” for house-
holds to spend on housing.12  
It would be ideal if low- and moderate-income families could bal-
ance their budgets every month, put aside some money for savings, and 
not need small-dollar loans. Employers should be pressured to provide 
full-time jobs with regular, full-time hours and livable wages. Federal, 
state, and local governments, the non-profit sector, and the private, 
for-profit sector should support and fund job training programs, af-
fordable housing programs, and programs that help individuals and 
families move to find better jobs. In the meantime, while income con-
tinues to fall behind or only just barely meet monthly expenses for 
many families, the need for small-dollar loans continues, and alterna-
tives to payday loans should be supported. 
III.  THE FINANCIAL HARM DONE BY PAYDAY LOANS 
Payday lenders comprise an estimated $40 billion to $50 billion, 
omnipresent, highly visible, politically powerful industry.13 The pay-
day loan product, which emerged in the 1990s and is used by more 
than twelve million U.S. households each year, is an extremely expen-
sive form of credit.14 Payday loans typically feature annual interest 
rates greater than 300% and short repayment terms.15 While payday 
loans used to feature a very short, two-week term, designed to match 
a borrower’s payday period, payday lenders are now offering non-
amortizing, installment loans with terms longer than forty-five days in 
response to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s (CFPB) new 
payday lending rule.16 The new CFPB rule, which will go into effect 
 
 12. Nicole Elsasser Watson et al., Worst Case Housing Needs: 2017 Report to Congress, 
1 U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV. OFF. OF POL’Y DEV. & RES. 92, 3, 13 (2017), 
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/sites/default/files/pdf/Worst-Case-Housing-Needs.pdf. 
 13. Nathalie Martin, 1000% Interest—Good While Supplies Last: A Study of Payday 
Loan Practices and Solutions, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 563, 570, 595 (2010). 
 14. Payday Loan Facts and the CFPB’s Impact, PEW CHARITABLE TR. (Jan. 14, 2016), 
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/fact-sheets/2016/01/payday-loan-facts-and 
-the-cfpbs-impact. 
 15. Christine L. Dobridge, For Better and for Worse? Effects of Access to High-Cost 
Consumer Credit 7 (Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2016-056. Washington: Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2016.056. 
 16. See Gillian B. White, When Payday Loans Die, Something Else is Going to Replace 
Them, ATLANTIC (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/10/pay 
day-loan-occ/543453/; see also Gail MarksJarvis, Installment Loans Just as Risky as Payday 
Loans, Pew Warns, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 11, 2016, 3:39 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/busi
ness/ct-payday-loans-rules-pew-0812-biz-20160811-story.html. 
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in 2019 unless changed before then, applies to payday and auto-title 
loans with terms of less than forty-five days, and requires lenders to 
cap rollovers, limit repeated attempts to debit a borrower’s bank ac-
count, and make an up-front determination of a borrower’s ability to 
repay the loan. In response, payday lenders have created installment 
loan products with terms longer than forty-five days and with the same 
high interest rates and fees. 
A payday loan is commonly described as a high-interest loan for a 
small amount of money with the lender using a post-dated check or 
electronic access to the borrower’s checking account as collateral.17 
Many state lending laws permit payday lenders to charge high-interest 
rates; other states impose interest rate ceilings.18 In Texas, payday 
lenders get around state law interest rate caps by charging relatively 
low interest rates combined with high fees both for the initial loan and 
for subsequent rollovers or renewals of that first loan.19 For example, 
both the Texas Constitution and the Texas Finance Code set the usury 
rate at 10%.20 Lenders in Texas who wish to charge interest rates above 
10% are required to be licensed and regulated by the Texas Office of 
Consumer Credit Commissioner and are subject to interest rate caps 
of 18% to 30%.21 To avoid these interest rate regulations, payday loans 
in Texas are issued by an in-state company that originates the loan at 
10% or less, and the loan is administered by a separate, unaffiliated 
organization, regulated as a credit services organization, that charges 
high fees that are not subject to any state caps.22 Payday loans can be 
described as high-interest loans because the accepted metric for de-
scribing loans is the Annual Percentage Rate (APR), which is the com-
bination of interest and fees associated with a loan, calculated over a 
twelve-month period.23 
 
 17. Bourke, Horowitz & Roche, supra note 5, at 6. 
 18. See Heather Morton, Payday Lending State Statutes, NCSL (Jan. 23, 2018), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/payday-lending-state-statutes.a 
spx. 
 19. Sealy Hutchings & Matthew J. Nance, Credit Access Businesses: The Regulation of 
Payday and Title Loans in Texas, 66 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 76, 77, 79 (2012). 
 20. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 11; TEX. FIN. CODE § 324.004. 
 21. See TEX. FIN. CODE § 342. 
 22. See Lovick v. Ritemoney Ltd., 378 F.3d 433, 443–44 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that fees 
charged by credit-service organizations are not limited by Texas usury laws or laws requiring 
reasonable broker fees). 
 23. Annual Percentage Rate, BUSINESS DICTIONARY, http://www.businessdictionary.co 
m/definition/annual-percentage-rate-APR.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2018). 
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Many payday lenders advertise their loans as bearing $15 in fees 
for every $100 borrowed.24 To some borrowers, $15 in fees per $100 
borrowed appears to be an interest rate of 15% ($15/$100), which 
would be comparable to a credit card and to some of the small-dollar 
loan programs described in Part IV below. However, $15 in fees per 
$100 borrowed does not result in a 15% APR if the loan term is two 
weeks instead of one year. Instead, $15 in fees for $100 borrowed, 
when calculated over a twelve-month period to get an annual percent-
age rate results in a 391% APR ($15/$100 = .15 x 365 = 54.74/14 = 
3.91 x 100 = 391).25 This extremely high interest rate begs the opening 
question in this article of why more lenders have not entered the mar-
ket to offer small-dollar loans on more affordable terms. 
There is a common misconception that payday loan borrowers are 
turning to payday loans because they are unbanked, a term used to de-
scribe individuals who have neither a checking account nor a savings 
account with a bank. In fact, payday lenders require their borrowers to 
have a bank account. Before a borrower can receive a payday loan, the 
borrower must give the lender electronic access to their checking ac-
count or a post-dated check for the full amount of the loan plus the 
fee. Once the payday lender has access to the borrower’s bank account, 
either through the electronic funds transfer authorization or the post-
dated check, the payday lender immediately gives the borrower the full 
amount of the loan without further inquiry into the borrower’s ability 
to repay. The goal of the payday lender is to provide consumers quick 
and easy access to cash. If the borrower cannot repay the loan when it 
is due, which is the situation with over 80% of payday loans, the payday 
lender permits the borrower to renew the initial loan, typically for an-
other fee in equal amount to the initial fee.26 This pattern repeats itself 
 
 24. Bethany McLean, Payday Lending: Will Anything Better Replace It?, ATLANTIC 
(May 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/05/payday-lending/476403/. 
 25. APR  Calculation  Formula,  MISSOURI  DIVISION  OF  FINANCE,  https://finance.mo. 
gov/consumercredit/apr.php (last visited Nov. 8, 2018) (APR calculation formula = “FEE (Origi 
nation fee + Interest) divided by AMOUNT FINANCED divided by NUMBER OF DAYS OF 
TERM OF NOTE multiplied by 365 multiplied by 100 . . . .”); see also, Sheila Bair,  Low-Cost 
Payday Loans: Opportunities and Obstacles, 1 ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND. 89, 35 (June 2005), 
https://www.cfsponline.com/uploads/LowCostPaydayLoans.pdf (arguing that mandatory disclo-
sures should include both the APR and the cost per $100, to enable consumers to more easily 
compare loan products). 
 26. Kathleen Burke et al., CFPB Data Point: Payday Lending, 1 CONSUMER FIN. PROT. 
BUREAU 33, 4 (2014), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201403_cfpb_report_payday-lend-
ing.pdf (stating that half of all loans are renewed for at least ten two-week cycles, incurring addi-
tional renewal fees each time). 
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to the financial harm of the borrower and the financial benefit of the 
payday lender. Because nearly 70% of payday loan borrowers are in 
need of immediate cash to meet their everyday living expenses and 
have no savings or other source from which to borrow money, these 
borrowers are unlikely to have enough income to be able to repay the 
loan in full when it is due.27 These consumers are offered credit under 
terms, especially the length of the loan, that virtually guarantee default 
or renewal of the loan.28  
IV.  MARKET ALTERNATIVES: AFFORDABLE SMALL-DOLLAR 
LOANS  
In the past ten years, more affordable market alternatives to pay-
day loans have emerged. These loan products are the result of three, 
quite different, forces. 
First, some financial institutions, including both banks and credit 
unions, have entered the market as part of pilot programs initiated by 
regulators or trade union associations, or on their own initiative. These 
financial institutions realize that a good number of their account hold-
ers need small-dollar loans and see the long-term advantage of provid-
ing small-dollar loans to borrowers who may one day come back for a 
much larger loan.29 They typically have boards of directors or other 
influential members of management who believe that providing af-
fordable small-dollar loans is the right thing to do.30 Some banks also 
provide small-dollar consumer loans as part of their required, annual 
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) commitments to low- and mod-
erate-income families and neighborhoods.31 Some credit unions pride 
themselves on being low-income, community-based credit unions 
whose mission is to provide financial products tailored to their low- 
and moderate-income borrowers.32  
 
 27. Bourke, Horowitz & Roche, supra note 5, at 13. 
 28. Burke, supra note 26, at 4. 
 29. A Template for Success: The FDIC’s Small-Dollar Loan Pilot Program, 4 FDIC Q. 
28, 32 (2010) [hereinafter A Template for Success]. 
 30. Id. 
 31. The CRA is a 1977 federal law which covers national and state banks and savings as-
sociations whose deposits are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and 
requires these institutions to lend to, invest in, or serve low- and moderate-income households 
and neighborhoods in their service areas. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2901 (West 2009). Federal regulators 
conduct annual CRA examinations of covered institutions, and a poor result can be used to reject 
an institution’s application to expand or merge. Id. 
 32. Telephone Interview with Larry Garcia, Mountain Star Federal Credit Union (Apr. 
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Second, non-profit, charitable organizations have entered the mar-
ket as a response to the urgent needs of their low-income clients for 
affordable small-dollar loan products, and after realizing that financial 
education and legislative reform, while helpful and important, are not 
sufficient by themselves when their clients need immediate access to 
credit to pay their monthly bills. These non-profit lenders typically 
rely on low-interest loans or grants from foundations and banks to 
raise the necessary loan capital. Some of the banks that are not doing 
direct small-dollar lending themselves earn CRA credit by extending 
loan capital to these non-profit lenders. Non-profit organizations, 
much like credit unions, have found success with employer-based loan 
programs, in which the loan product is offered as a voluntary benefit 
to borrowers employed by participating employers.  
Third, some start-up financial technology (“fintech”) companies 
have entered the market in an attempt to take market share away from 
payday lenders and ameliorate the harms of payday lending. Fintech 
companies raise money from the private sector and, because they need 
to meet higher rates of return for these private market investors, offer 
rates that are higher than the small-dollar loan programs offered by 
banks, credit unions, and non-profit lenders but lower than payday 
loans. Federal and state consumer protection agencies and consumer 
advocates need to monitor these for-profit lenders to ensure they are 
keeping their promises and to help borrowers identify the good 
fintech lenders. 
In addition, a bill has been introduced in the Senate that would 
allow the U.S. Postal Service to provide small-dollar loans. The U.S. 
Postal Service already has brick and mortar locations throughout ur-
ban and rural America and the trust of borrowers. This option should 
be explored further and supported. 
Regardless of the affordable small-dollar lender’s motive, the af-
fordable small-dollar loans now on the market are providing some con-
sumers with access to small amounts of credit at affordable rates. To 
date, these alternative, affordable small-dollar loan programs are not 
nearly as ubiquitous as payday loans, are not yet available in many ge-
ographic areas, and are further limited by employer, by credit union, 
 
20, 2018); Scheiber, supra note 9 (describing the differences among credit unions in their ap-
proaches to providing affordable financial products to their low-income workers). 
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and sometimes by credit history. However, they are growing in num-
ber and size, and collectively they can make a difference for many. 
Each of these alternative lenders should be supported and encouraged. 
A.  Financial Institutions and Affordable Small-Dollar Loans 
Banks and credit unions are well-positioned to succeed in the 
small-dollar loan market because they are already in the business of 
extending credit, have access to loan capital, have existing customers 
who are using payday loans, and have a pervasive regional or national 
presence.33 However, banks are under pressure from their shareholders 
to maximize profits, and both banks and credit unions are under pres-
sure from their regulators to carry adequate reserves and engage in re-
sponsible underwriting. In addition, as described in more detail below, 
although free to charge higher rates, banks are reluctant to charge the 
interest rates that they would need to charge to make small-dollar 
loans profitable, for fear of being stigmatized as payday lenders. Banks 
and many credit unions would also need to devote significant re-
sources, including developing community partners, to build trust with 
small-dollar borrowers. It is worth noting that credit unions are in a 
slightly different posture from banks because they are exempt from 
paying federal income taxes and not included in the coverage of the 
CRA, on the assumption that their mission is to provide affordable fi-
nancial services to their members. With a few notable exceptions de-
scribed below, neither banks nor credit unions are as engaged in the 
small-dollar loan market as would be ideal for borrowers; but there are 
recent signs that that may be changing, as discussed below. 
1.  Banks should offer small-dollar loans themselves and should 
continue to provide low-interest loan capital to other small-dollar 
lenders 
Banks are well-positioned to offer lower-cost alternatives to pay-
day loans because of operational advantages they have over payday 
 
 33. For this paper, “banks” refers to retail commercial banks chartered under either fed-
eral or state law and regulated by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal 
Reserve System, or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and includes public and private 
banks and banks with either a national or regional reach. For this paper, “credit unions” refers to 
credit unions chartered under either federal or state law and regulated by the National Credit 
Union Administration, and includes credit unions with either a national or regional reach. 
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lenders. Banks may also avoid state interest rate ceilings by being head-
quartered in a state without a usury cap. This ability to evade state in-
terest rate caps allows a bank to charge an appropriate interest rate on 
a small-dollar loan product to compensate for the risks and expenses 
of offering the product.34 Yet, banks have historically been reluctant to 
provide affordable small-dollar loans. There are hopeful, recent signs 
that banks may be entering this market, with support from the CFPB, 
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”), and other 
federal banking regulators, as explained below. 
 a.  Operational advantages of banks. Banks could provide lower-
cost alternatives to payday loans because they have an infrastructure in 
place that can minimize operational costs. Banks already have facilities, 
staff, and collection processes in place. Banks also have an existing cus-
tomer base to which they can market a lower-cost loan product, and 
81% of payday loan customers state that, if eligible, they would prefer 
to borrow from a bank or credit union than from a payday lender.35 
Banks already have access to their customers’ accounts so, unlike      
payday lenders, they would not have to coordinate with another            
financial services provider to collect on the loan. Finally, banks derive 
their income from a variety of products and services allowing them to 
tap other revenue streams to develop and market the product and to    
withstand the potentially high initial loan charge-off rate while they 
determine the appropriate interest rate. As a result, banks are in a        
favorable position to provide small-dollar loans at a lower cost than 
payday lenders.36 
Additionally, national and state banks can avoid state interest rate 
ceilings. The National Banking Act preempts state usury laws, allow-
ing national banks to charge a higher interest rate than state law al-
lows.37 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the National Banking 
Act allows national banks to be governed by the usury limitation, or 
lack of limitation, of their home states when making loans to customers 
in a different state.”38 States, starting with South Dakota and Delaware, 
 
 34. Bair, supra note 25, at 34 (suggesting that if depository institutions can match payday 
lenders’ speed and convenience with a lower priced product, they could capture significant mar-
ket share). 
 35. Nick Bourke et. al., Payday Loan Customers Want More Protections, Access to 
Lower-Cost Credit from Banks, 1 PEW CHARITABLE TR. 24, 6 (2017),   https://www.pewtrusts. 
org/-/media/assets/2017/04/payday-loan-customers-want-more-protections.pdf. 
 36. Hayes, supra note 4, at 1157. 
 37. National Banking Act, 12 U.S.C.A. § 85 (West 1980). 
 38. Marquette Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 
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began eliminating their usury limits in order to attract banks to their 
states. As a result, many national banks moved their headquarters to 
states without usury limits in order to export the lack of an interest rate 
ceiling and charge customers any interest rate they like, regardless of 
the usury laws of the state in which the loan is made. State chartered 
banks,39 arguing unfair competition from nationally chartered banks, 
lobbied Congress for the same right, which Congress granted in 12 
U.S.C. § 1831(d) (2002). National and state banks could, thus, offer a 
small-dollar loan product without being subject to state usury laws.40 
Despite these advantages, mainstream financial institutions, in-
cluding the major national retail banks, have for the most part failed to 
meet the needs of low- and moderate-income families for small-dollar 
loans. Most banks say that they cannot make the numbers work with 
small-dollar loans because the back-office expenses of a $1000 loan are 
the same as those for a much larger loan, while the interest that can be 
made on the smaller loan is not nearly as large. Bank officials consider 
payday loans to be high-risk products that require extremely high in-
terest rates to maintain profitability. Banks perceive payday loans as 
unfeasible because of the high transaction costs in servicing and un-
derwriting the loans.41 Additionally, offering loans at high interest 
rates in order to compensate for risks and costs opens up banks for 
criticism from public policy officials, the media, and consumer advo-
cates. The risk of harming their reputations may be keeping banks 
away from the market despite the knowledge that they are foregoing a 
multi-billion-dollar business.42 Banks also need guidance and support 
from their regulators.43  
 
(1978). 
 39. State chartered banks are organized under state law. They can, but do not have to, be 
a member of the Federal Reserve. State chartered banks that are members of the Federal Reserve 
are primarily regulated by the Federal Reserve. State chartered banks that are not members of 
the Federal Reserve are primarily regulated by the FDIC. Nationally chartered banks, on the 
other hand, are organized under federal law, including the National Banking Act. Nationally 
chartered banks are required to be members of the Federal Reserve and are primarily regulated 
by the OCC. See Harry Sit, What Type of Bank Is Your Bank?, FIN. BUFF (Oct. 2, 2007), 
https://thefinancebuff.com/what-type-of-bank-is-your-bank.html. 
 40. Nathalie Martin, Public Opinion and the Limits of State Law: The Case for A Federal 
Usury Cap, 34 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 259, 264–65 (2014). 
 41. Michael Bertics, Fixing Payday Lending: The Potential of Greater Bank Involvement, 
9 N.C. BANKING INST. 133, 153 (2005). 
 42. Kenneth, supra note 4, at 703-04. 
 43. See Nick Bourke, How CFPB Rules Can Encourage Banks and Credit Unions to Of-
fer Low-Cost Small Loans, PEW CHARITABLE TR. (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.pewtrusts.org/e 
n/research-and-analysis/articles/2016/04/05/how-cfpb-rules-can-encourage-banks-and-credit-u 
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 b.  The FDIC’s template for banks to issue small-dollar loans. The 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has developed a tem-
plate for banks that wish to make small-dollar loans.44 In June 2007, 
the FDIC announced guidelines for a two-year, small-dollar loan pilot 
program to evaluate whether banks could offer affordable and profita-
ble small-dollar loan programs. The guidelines noted that the high use 
of payday loans and fee-based, overdraft programs by individuals with 
checking accounts at banks was a red flag to the banks that their cus-
tomers need affordable small-dollar loans. The FDIC pilot program 
ran from December 2007 to December 2009, and twenty-eight banks, 
with total assets ranging in size from $28 million to $10 billion, and 
together having more than 450 offices in twenty-seven states, partici-
pated in the program. The small number of banks that participated in 
the pilot program and the fact that few banks continued offering small-
dollar loans after the pilot program indicate that banks need more sup-
port and encouragement than they received in the pilot program. 
The FDIC provided each bank participating in the pilot program 
with guidelines (“Affordable Small-Dollar Loan Guidelines”) for how 
to implement a small-dollar loan product and permitted banks some 
flexibility to encourage innovation.45 At the end of the pilot program, 
based on the experience of the participant banks, the FDIC created a 
template for banks entering the small-dollar loan space. The template, 
“A Safe, Affordable, and Feasible Template for Small-Dollar Loans,” 
incorporates lessons learned during the pilot program and copies fea-
tures of the payday loan process that are important to borrowers seek-
ing frictionless access to credit, such as a quick credit decision.46 The 
template requires an APR of 36%47 or less, a loan term of ninety days 
 
nions-to-offer-lower-cost-small-loans [hereinafter Bourke, How CFPB Rules Can Encourage 
Banks];  see  also  Standards Needed for Safe Small Installment Loans from Banks,  Credit  Un-
ions, 1 PEW CHARITABLE TR. 10 (2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2018/02/-
standards_needed_final.pdf. 
 44. A Template for Success, supra note 29. 
 45. Id. at 29. 
 46. Id. 
 47. The 36% APR cap is frequently used as a benchmark for payday lending reforms. In 
addition to the FDIC pilot program, Congress approved a 36% rate cap on loans offered to active 
duty members of the military and their dependents in the Military Lending Act of 2006. The 
36% benchmark comes from the advocacy of the Russell Sage Foundation and fellow reform 
groups in the early 20th century when a black market for illegal usurious small loans thrived. The 
Russell Sage Foundation was successful in getting thirty-four states to adopt versions of the Uni-
form Small Loan Law with interest rate caps of around 36%. See Lauren K. Saunders, Why 
36%? The History, Use, and Purpose of the 36% Interest Rate Cap, 1 NAT’L CONSUMER LAW 
CTR. 14 (2013), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/why36pct.pdf. While many civil 
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or greater, and a loan decision within twenty-four hours of the          
borrower’s application. 
The results of the FDIC pilot program demonstrate that banks can 
offer small-dollar loans that are commercially sustainable, albeit not as 
profitable as other products they offer. Overall, the banks participating 
in the pilot program originated over 34,400 loans, totaling $40.2 mil-
lion in extended credit. The loans were made at interest rates ranging 
from 13% to 16%, with administrative fees that ranged from $31 to 
$46. When fees are combined with interest rates, the average APR for 
these loans was safely below the 36% cap set in the FDIC’s pilot pro-
gram guidelines.48 The thirty-day delinquency rates for the loans, cap-
turing the number of loan repayments that were thirty or more days 
late, were high, and markedly higher than comparable, unsecured 
small-dollar loan products offered by the same banks. Specifically, in 
the fourth quarter of 2009, the average thirty-day delinquency rate for 
the small-dollar loans was 11%, as compared with 2.5% for similar un-
secured, small-dollar loan products. The banks’ charge-off ratios49 in 
the pilot program were similar to the industry average: 6.2% as of the 
fourth quarter of 2009 for small-dollar loans in the pilot program, as 
compared with 5.4% for the fourth quarter of 2009 for similar unse-
cured loans to individuals. 
Banks in the FDIC program reported that the profits on the small-
dollar loan programs were not as high as the profits from their other 
products and that they used the small-dollar loan program to create 
goodwill in the community and to cultivate relationships with borrow-
ers who might eventually demand higher profit products from the 
bank. The FDIC reported that the participating banks requested the 
flexibility to issue “nearly small-dollar loans” (consumer loans with 
loan amounts between $1000 and $2500) in addition to “small-dollar 
loans” (consumer loans with loan amounts of up to $1000), both be-
cause their customers were demanding these loans and because these 
loans brought in more revenues to the bank and cost the same amount 
to originate and service. The FDIC template permits loans of up to 
 
rights and consumer rights organizations still advocate for the 36% APR cap, limiting monthly 
installment payments to 5% of gross monthly income is emerging as an alternative measure of 
affordability. See infra, text accompanying note 71. 
 48. A Template for Success, supra note 29, at 28, 30. 
 49. “Charge-off” refers to outstanding debt that the creditor has deemed uncollectible 
because the borrower has become substantially delinquent after a period of time. See Charge-off, 
INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/chargeoff.asp (last visited Nov. 8, 2018). 
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$2500 to capture the banks’ stated interest in being able to extend both 
small-dollar loans and nearly small-dollar loans.50 
While the FDIC’s pilot program limited loans to APRs below 
36%, banks are free to offer small-dollar loans at higher rates in the 
open market if they are headquartered in states without interest rate 
caps. Higher interest rates could be used to offset the costs of the prod-
uct. However, the presumption of high risk justifying high interest 
rates may be questioned. Loan losses for payday loans may not be sig-
nificantly higher than those associated with other financial products.51 
By charging high interest rates, payday lenders operate at high mar-
gins, with one professor of economics suggesting that payday lenders 
earn returns on equity at ten to twenty times the rates of traditional 
banks.52 The discrepancy between returns on equity suggests a market 
opportunity for banks. However, the difficulty of finding an appropri-
ate interest rate that both allows the product to be profita-
ble while maintaining goodwill in the community and cultivating rela-
tionships with borrowers may explain the reluctance of 
banks to enter the small-dollar loan market without additional support 
from their regulators. 
 c.  Banks benefit from the payday loan industry. It is important to 
note that banks benefit financially from the payday loan industry. To 
qualify for a payday loan, consumers must have a bank account, both 
as a place for the payday lender to deposit the principal amount of the 
loan and as a source of repayment of the loan, whether by postdated 
check or electronic funds transfer authorization. Banks collect fees re-
lated to the set up and maintenance of these checking and savings ac-
counts, and when payday lenders attempt to collect a payment from a 
bank account with insufficient funds, banks collect overdraft and in-
sufficient funds fees from the borrower of $35 per transaction.53 While 
 
 50. A Template for Success, supra note 29, at 28, 30. 
 51. Kenneth, supra note 4, at 688 (citing Paul Chessin, Borrowing from Peter to Pay Paul: 
A Statistical Analysis of Colorado’s Deferred Deposit Loan Act, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 387, 408 
(2005) (finding charge-off rates for payday loans comparable to those for loans from commercial 
banks and less than those for credit cards)); Michael A. Stegman & Robert Faris, Payday Lending: 
A Business Model that Encourages Chronic Borrowing, 17 ECON. DEV. Q. 8, 23 (2003) (finding 
charge-offs had a minor impact on profits compared to the convenience and location of the store). 
 52. Kenneth, supra note 4, at 689 (citing Steven M. Graves & Christopher L. Peterson, 
Predatory Lending and the Military: The Law and Geography of “Payday” Loans in Military 
Towns, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 653, 664 (2005)). 
 53. Jean Ann Fox, 2011 CFA Survey of Big Bank Overdraft Loan Fees and Terms, 1 
CONSUMER FED’N OF AMERICA 5, 1 (2011), https://consumerfed.org/pdfs/OD-14BankSurvey 
-ChartAugust2011.pdf. 
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Regulation E of the Electronic Fund Transfers Act prohibits lenders, 
including financial institutions and non-profit and for-profit lenders, 
from conditioning consumer credit on the borrower agreeing to repay 
by preauthorized electronic funds transfer, there is an express excep-
tion for credit extended under an overdraft credit plan.54 
In August 2017, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau re-
ported that banks and credit unions collected an estimated $15 billion 
in overdraft and bounced check fees in 2016, with an average overdraft 
amount of just over $20 and an average overdraft “protection” fee of 
$34.55 In fact, the APR on these overdraft fees is even higher than the 
high APRs on payday loans.56 
 d.  Banks previously offered payday loans. While most of the blame 
for payday loans falls on the private corporations that dominate the 
payday loan industry—Advance America, Cash America, Ace Express, 
etc.—some of the biggest U.S. banks also offered the equivalent of 
payday loans until sufficient pressure was brought to bear for them to 
end this practice. These products, instead of being called payday loans, 
were marketed as “deposit advance” loans and carried fees and terms 
that were almost identical to those offered by payday lenders.57 Specif-
ically, Wells Fargo marketed a “Direct Deposit Advance”; U.S. Bank 
offered a “Checking Account Advance”; Regions Bank had a “Ready 
Advance”; Fifth Third Bank had an “Early Access” product; Bank of 
Oklahoma and its affiliate banks had a “Fast Loan” product; and Guar-
anty Bank had an “Easy Advance.”58  
In November 2013, the Office of the Comptroller of Currency 
(OCC) issued guidance regarding deposit advance products stating 
that the OCC would take supervisory action to “address any unsafe or 
unsound banking practices associated with these products, to prevent 
harm to consumers, and to ensure compliance with all applicable 
 
 54. 12 C.F.R. § 205.10(e) (2017) (“No financial institution or other person may condition 
an extension of credit to a consumer on the consumer’s repayment by preauthorized electronic 
fund transfer, except for credit extended under an overdraft credit plan or extended to maintain 
a specified minimum balance in the consumer’s account.”). 
 55. David Low et al., Data Point: Frequent Overdrafters, 1 CONSUMER FIN. PROT. 
BUREAU 50, 32 (2017), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201708_cfpb_data-
point_frequent-overdrafters.pdf. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See Rebecca Borné & Peter Smith, Triple-Digit Danger: Bank Payday Lending Per-
sists, 1 CTR. FOR RESP. LENDING 2, 2 (2013), https://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lend-
ing/research-analysis/Triple-Digit-Bank-Payday-Loans-Summary.pdf. 
 58. Id. 
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laws.”59 OCC examiners would assess the credit quality of consumers, 
adequacy of capital, reliance on fee income, and adequacy of allowance 
for loan losses.60 On the whole, the 2013 OCC guidance made it more 
difficult for banks to offer deposit advance products. The guidance re-
mained in place for almost four years until it was rescinded in October 
2017, with the OCC arguing that banks could “serve consumers’ needs 
for short-term, small-dollar credit” and needed more flexibility to offer 
alternatives to “less-regulated lenders.”61 The change in guidance by 
the OCC has opened up the possibility for nationally chartered banks 
to offer affordable deposit advances, while state-chartered banks are 
still subject to FDIC supervision on the product.62 
 e.  The OCC issues helpful guidance for small-dollar installment 
loans and U.S. Bank introduces its Simple Loan. On May 23, 2018, the 
OCC published OCC Bulletin 2018-14, entitled “Core Lending Prin-
ciples for Short-Term, Small-Dollar Installment Lending.” The Bul-
letin sets out an illustrative list of loan features of short-term, small-
dollar installment loans that it considers to be reasonable policies and 
practices.63 The list includes: loan amounts and repayment terms that 
are affordable and reasonable for the particular borrower; loan pricing 
that complies with applicable state laws and is reasonably related to 
costs and risk; underwriting based on ability to repay not just tradi-
tional credit scoring; flexible loan servicing that works with borrowers 
who need reasonable workout strategies; and timely reporting to credit 
borrowers to enable borrowers to build or rebuild their credit.64 The 
OCC’s announcement has been heralded by some consumer advocates 
for giving mainstream financial institutions the regulatory support 
they need to offer affordable small-dollar loans.65 
 
 59. Guidance on Supervisory Concerns and Expectations Regarding Deposit Advance 
Products, 78 Fed. Reg. 70624 (Nov. 26, 2013). 
 60. Id. at 624. 
 61. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, RESCISSION OF GUIDANCE ON SUPERVISORY 
CONCERNS AND EXPECTATIONS REGARDING DEPOSIT ADVANCE PRODUCTS (2017). 
 62. Id.; Joe Adler et al., As CFPB Closes Door on Payday, OCC Opens One for Deposit 
Advance, AM. BANKER (Oct. 5. 2017, 1:56 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/as-
cfpb-closes-door-on-payday-occ-opens-one-for-deposit-advance. 
 63. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, CORE LENDING PRINCIPLES FOR SHORT-TERM, 
SMALL-DOLLAR INSTALLMENT LENDING (2018). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Nick Bourke, Momentum Is Building for Small-Dollar Loans, AM. BANKER (Sept. 12, 
2018, 10:22 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/momentum-is-building-for-small-
dollar-loans [hereinafter Bourke, Momentum Is Building for Small-Dollar Loans]; but see Re-
becca Borne, High-Cost Bank Loans a Step in the Wrong Direction, AM. BANKER (Oct. 3, 2018, 
10:13 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/high-cost-bank-loans-a-step-in-the-
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On September 10, 2018, U.S. Bank, the fifth largest commercial 
bank in the United States, announced that it will offer a new, small 
installment loan with monthly payments of no more than 5% of a bor-
rower’s monthly income.66 The loan, called a Simple Loan, can be in 
an amount of $100 to $1000, repayable over three months in three, 
equal payments, with fees of $12 per $100 borrowed if repaid by elec-
tronic funds transfer from a checking account or $15 per $100 if not, 
and no late fees, missed-payment fees, or prepayment penalties.67 
When applied over a loan term of three months, a fee of $15 per $100 
borrowed represents an APR of 61% ($15/$100 = .15 x 365 = 54.74/90 
= .61 x 100 = 61). In order to apply for a Simple Loan, a prospective 
borrower must first open a checking account with U.S. Bank, have that 
checking account for six months, and establish at least a three-month 
track record of making payments into the account, either from 
paychecks or Social Security payments.68 Loan applications are evalu-
ated and, if approved, funded within minutes, with U.S. Bank pulling 
a credit report to evaluate the applicant’s ability to repay.69 Borrowers 
may only take out one Simple Loan at a time and must wait for thirty 
days after repayment of one loan before taking out a subsequent loan. 
While there is criticism from some consumer advocates that the 
Simple Loan carries an APR above 36% and therefore above many 
state consumer lending laws,70 a 61% APR is significantly below the 
much higher APRs of payday loans and may be what is needed for 
 
wrong-direction (arguing that the best way to ensure affordability is an interest rate cap of 36%); 
Letter to Federal Regulators from Civil Rights and Consumer Rights Organiza-
tions  (May  14,  2018),  https://www.responsiblelending.org/sites/default/files/nodes/files/re-
search-publication/crl-bank-usury-joint-regulators-4may2018.pdf (urging regulators that “all fi-
nancial institutions engaged in small-dollar lending (1) limit interest rates to 36% or less, and (2) 
determine borrowers’ ability to repay their loans by assessing both income and expenses rather 
than engaging in collateral-based income-only underwriting.”). 
 66. Small-Dollar Loans Made Simple, U.S. BANK (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.us-
bank.com/newsroom/stories/small-dollar-loans-made-simple.html. 
 67. U.S. Bank Launches Simple Loan to Meet Customers’ Short-Term Cash Needs, BUS. 
WIRE (Sept. 10, 2018, 10:30 AM), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20180910005578
/en/U.S.-Bank-Launches-Simple-Loan-Meet-Customers%E2%80%99. 
 68. See Russ Wiles, This Payday-Like Loan Is Brought to You by  . . . a Bank?, ARIZ. 
REPUBLIC (Sept. 23, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://eu.azcentral.com/story/money/business/consumer
s/208/09/23/us-bank-offers-payday-loans-and-slammed-critics/1307168002/. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See e.g., Borne, supra note 65. 
(5) PLATTS-MILLS.FINAL ARTICLE, POST PROOF, 2.6.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/6/2019  4:43 PM 
101] Challenging Payday Lenders 
121 
banks to enter the affordable small-dollar loan market and start to dis-
place payday loans.71 
Rather than offering small-dollar loans with interest rates and fees 
comparable to payday lenders, banks could and should enter the small-
dollar loan market with rates that work for the banks but are more af-
fordable than payday loans. The OCC and U.S. Bank appear to be set-
ting a good example, and hopefully other banks and regulators will fol-
low their lead. 
f.  Examples of other small-dollar loan programs offered by banks. 
Spring Bank is an FDIC-insured community bank in New York City 
that has obtained both a Community Development Financial Institu-
tions (CDFI) designation for lending and investing in low- and mod-
erate-income communities and a B-Corp72 designation for having a 
double bottom line that includes financial inclusion and credit building 
for unbanked and underbanked consumers outside the financial main-
stream.73 Spring Bank offers its customers more affordable financial 
products including several affordable small-dollar loans. One option is 
a Spring Bank Employee Opportunity Loan of $1000 to $2500, with a 
16% APR and a term of twelve months, with no minimum credit score 
requirement, payments automatically deducted from the employee’s 
paycheck, and no financial commitment for participant employers. An-
other option is a Spring Bank Start Loan of $1000 to $1500, with a 
16% APR and a term of twelve months, with no minimum credit 
score requirement.74 
Elastic, a line of credit offered by Republic Bank, a Louisville, Ken-
tucky-based bank, is an example of a small-dollar loan product offered 
 
 71. See e.g., Standards Needed for Safe Small Installment Loans from Banks, Credit Un-
ions, supra note 43 (advocating for affordable installment payments of no more than 5% of a 
borrower’s gross paycheck, double-digit APRs that decline as the amount borrowed increases, 
total costs of no more than half of loan principal, loan payments that cannot trigger overdraft or 
insufficient funds fees, online or mobile application with automated loan approval to ensure 
speedy access to credit, and reporting to credit bureaus). 
 72. B-Corp designation is a seal of good corporate housekeeping awarded by a non-profit 
organization named B-Lab, which evaluates applications from corporations that seek the desig-
nation based on their commitment to meeting standards of “social and environmental perfor-
mance, public transparency, and legal accountability.” See About B Corps, CERTIFIED B CORP., 
https://bcorporation.net/about-b-corps (last visited Nov. 8, 2018). 
 73. Our Story, SPRING BANK, https://springbankny.com/our-story/ (last visited Nov. 8, 
2018). 
 74. Personal Lending, SPRING BANK, https://springbankny.com/personal-lending/ (last 
visited Nov. 8, 2018). 
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by a bank with rates higher than 36% but far lower than payday lend-
ers. Upon approval following a credit check, borrowers receive a $500 
to $3500 credit line and can borrow as little as $20 or as much as their 
credit line. Elastic encourages responsible lending through an en-
forced cooling off period. If a borrower has a balance greater than $0 
for ten consecutive months, the borrower will be unable to request ad-
ditional cash withdrawals until her balance is $0 for twenty consecutive 
days.75 Elastic is currently offered in forty states but is not available to 
borrowers covered under the Military Lending Act because APRs for 
the product exceed 36%.76 For a $100 loan with three bi-weekly pay-
ments, Elastic charges $10.26 in fees for an APR of 89%.77 For a $100 
loan with two monthly payments, Elastic charges $21.11 in fees for an 
APR of 128%.78 
As will be discussed in Part V, there remains a critical role for 
mainstream financial institutions in solving the payday loan crisis: ei-
ther deciding to originate small-dollar consumer loans themselves at 
lower interest rates than payday lenders, or supporting other afforda-
ble small-dollar lenders by providing low-interest loan capital. Banks 
can participate in these ways because it is the right, moral thing to do; 
because it is a way to cultivate future, mainstream borrowers; and be-
cause they can receive CRA credit in return. 
2.  Credit unions should offer affordable small-dollar loans to their 
low- and moderate-income members 
Credit unions, like banks, should be able to offer small-dollar loans 
at lower costs than payday lenders and have an opportunity to play a 
leading role in providing alternatives to payday loans. Like banks, 
credit unions have several institutional advantages over payday lend-
ers.79 Credit unions already have the infrastructure to offer small con-
sumer loans, including physical locations, staff, and an existing cus-
tomer base that should minimize marketing costs. In addition, credit 
unions can minimize credit losses through the use of direct deposit and 
 
 75. How It Works, REPUBLIC BANK, https://www.elastic.com/how-it-works/ (last visited 
Nov. 8, 2018); FAQs, REPUBLIC BANK, https://www.elastic.com/FAQs/ (last visited Nov. 8, 
2018). 
 76. Id. 
 77. What It Costs, REPUBLIC BANK, https://www.elastic.com/what-it-costs/ (last visited 
Nov. 8, 2018). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Bair, supra note 25, at 32. 
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electronic funds repayments from checking accounts. Finally, credit 
unions have diverse product offerings and do not have to rely exclu-
sively on the revenues from their small-dollar loan programs, unlike 
payday lenders. Unlike banks, national credit unions are limited by 
federal law to 15% interest rates, although the National Credit Union 
Administration (NCUA) is able to raise that interest rate cap when it 
deems it necessary; the current permissible interest rate cap for federal 
credit unions set by the NCUA is 18%, with a 28% interest rate per-
mitted for certain products, as discussed below.80 
The National Credit Union Foundation estimates that 10% to 
20% of credit union members use payday loans.81 This fact, in addition 
to all the other press about the need for small-dollar loans, demon-
strates that there is a need for members of credit unions to have an 
affordable small-dollar loan product as an alternative to payday loans. 
Few credit unions, however, currently offer alternatives to payday 
loans. Credit unions, like banks, seem to perceive small-dollar loans as 
not only unprofitable, but also fraught with reputational risk and in-
sufficiently supported by regulators, including the NCUA.82 Credit 
unions may also avoid small-dollar loans because they are perceived as 
risky products by insurance adjusters and may result in higher insur-
ance premiums on their deposits.83 A credit union also serves a partic-
ular community. A credit union might not offer small-dollar loans ei-
ther because the community it serves has sufficiently high income 
that there is not a demand for the product or because its board of di-
rectors fails to recognize a legitimate demand for the product within 
the community.84 
The good news is that some credit unions have made a commit-
ment to providing affordable small-dollar loans to their members and 
national models are in place for other credit unions to join them. Here 
are some examples. 
 
 80. See Federal Credit Union Act, 12 U.S.C. §1757(5)(A)(vi)(I); see also, NAT’L CREDIT 
UNION ADMIN., PERMISSIBLE LOAN INTEREST RATE CEILING EXTENDED (2015), 
https://www.ncua.gov/Resources/Documents/LFCU2015-02.pdf (stating that the NCUA was 
renewing the permissible interest rate of 18% for another three years). 
 81. NAT’L CREDIT UNION FOUND., PAYDAY LENDING: A REAL SOLUTIONS 
IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE (Mar. 23, 2009), https://issuu.com/thinkcreative/dosc/real_solu-
tions_payday_loan_toolkit. 
 82. Bair, supra note 25, at 10. 
 83. Telephone Interview with Aaron Duffy, Appalachian Community Federal Credit Un-
ion (Apr. 4, 2018). 
 84. Telephone Interview with Larry Garcia, supra note 32. 
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a.  National Credit Union Administration Payday Alternative Loan 
(PAL) product: more credit unions should offer this product. The Pay-
day Alternative Loan (PAL) product is a small-dollar loan offered by 
federal credit unions and regulated by federal law and the NCUA. The 
NCUA reported that in the fourth quarter of 2017, there were 503 
federal credit unions that reported making payday alternative loans and 
federal credit unions held $38.6 million in payday alternative loans on 
their books by the end of the fourth quarter of 2017.85  
The PAL is available to members of federal credit unions and in-
cludes the following required features: principal loan amounts between 
$200 and $1000; a 28% interest rate; a loan application fee of no more 
than $20; a repayment term of one month to six months; no rollovers, 
although the term of the loan may be extended for three months as 
long as the maximum length of the term is still at or below six months 
and no fee is charged for the extension; a fully amortized loan; and only 
one PAL outstanding at a time and no more than three PAL’s in any 
rolling, six-month period.86 The NCUA recognized the need for credit 
unions to charge slightly higher interest rates on the PAL product and 
increased the permissible interest rate from 18% to 28%.87 
The federal regulations encourage federal credit unions to develop 
borrower underwriting standards that strike the appropriate balance 
between protecting the credit union’s financial stability and giving 
borrowers the quick access to credit that they need. Applicants are re-
quired to provide proof of employment or income. The regulations 
also list optional, helpful loan features, including a savings component, 
financial education, reporting to credit bureaus, and encouraging bor-
rowers to use payroll deduction for loan repayments.88 The NCUA, 
which also insures credit union deposits, stipulates that a credit union’s 
PAL product will not result in higher insurance premiums so that 
 
 85. NCUA Wants to Expand Payday Lending Alternatives for Credit Unions, Customers, 
NAT’L CREDIT UNION ADMIN. (May 24, 2018), https://www.ncua.gov/newsroom/Pages/news-
2018-may-expand-payday-lending-alternatives-credit-unions-consumers.aspx; 12 C.F.R. § 701 
(2010);  NAT’L CREDIT UNION ADMIN.,  12  CFR  PART  701  PAYDAY  ALTERNATIVE LOANS  
PROPOSED RULE, https://www.ncua.gov/About/Documents/Agenda%20Items/AG20180524It
em3b.pdf. 
 86. 12 C.F.R. § 701 (2010); Short-Term, Small Amount Loans, 75 Fed. Reg. 58285 (Sept. 
24, 2010), https://www.ncua.gov/Legal/Documents/Regulations/FIR20100916SmAmt.pdf. 
 87. See, NAT’L CREDIT UNION ADMIN., FINAL RULE – PART 701, SHORT-TERM, SMALL 
AMOUNT LOANS (2010), https://www.ncua.gov/Legal/Documents/Regulatory%20Alerts/RA2
010-13.pdf (reporting the NCUA Board decision to increase the permissible interest rate for PAL 
loans to 28% APR). 
 88. Id. 
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credit unions are not penalized with higher premiums for offering a 
PAL product.89 
As of 2016, about one in seven federal credit unions participates in 
the PAL program. These credit unions issued approximately 170,000 
loans under the program in 2014, while accounting for far less than 
1% of the volume of payday loans issued that year.90 There have been 
promising signs for the PAL program. In 2015, credit unions origi-
nated $123.3 million in payday alternative loans—a 7.2% increase over 
2014.91 During the fourth quarter of 2017, 503 federal credit unions 
reported making PALs for $38.6 million in loans total.92 On May 24, 
2018, the NCUA proposed a rule to create a new product in addition 
to the PAL.93 In proposing the product, NCUA Board Chairman J. 
Mark McWatters explained that the PAL product had been “extremely 
effective” and the NCUA wanted to create additional alternatives to 
payday loans.94 The proposed product includes most of the features of 
the PAL, with four changes: (1) a maximum loan amount at $2000 and 
no minimum loan amount; (2) a maximum term of the loan at twelve 
months; (3) no required minimum length of credit union membership; 
and (4) no restrictions on the number of loans a federal credit union 
may make to the borrower in a six-month period, provided the bor-
rower has only one outstanding loan at a time.95 
Since the introduction of the PAL program, technology has been 
developed to aid credit unions in offering PALs. QCash is a technology 
platform developed by Washington State Employees Credit Union 
and is available to other credit unions to facilitate the offering of PALs 
to their members.96 QCash allows credit union members to apply for 
 
 89. Telephone Interview with Aaron Duffy, supra note 83. 
 90. Nick Bourke, Why Credit Unions Should Pay Attention to the Payday Loan Market—
and What the CFPB Does  About  It,  PEW  CHARITABLE  TR.  (Jan.  6,  2016),  http://www.pew 
trusts.org/en/about/news-room/opinion/2016/01/06/why-credit-unions-should-pay-attention-
to-the-payday-loan-market-and-what-the-cfpb-does-about-it. 
 91. Eric Naing, Credit Unions Offering More Payday Alternative Loans, CQ ROLL CALL 
(Mar. 21, 2016), Westlaw 2016 CQBNKRPT 0416. 
 92. NCUA Wants to Expand Payday Lending Alternatives for Credit Unions, Customers, 
supra note 85. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. About QCash, QCASH FIN., https://www.q-cash.com/about-qcash/ (last visited Nov. 
8, 2018); Telephone Interview with Jim Brown, University Federal Credit Union, (May 11, 
2018). 
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PALs either online or through a mobile app.97 QCash has customizable 
features that enable QCash to remain compliant with regulations re-
gardless of the state in which the loan is issued.98 The credit union can 
also set their own pricing, terms, and underwriting criteria for the PAL 
to meet the particular needs of the credit union.99  
The NCUA PAL program demonstrates that credit unions can of-
fer viable alternatives to payday loans and represents a public policy 
blessing from the NCUA in support of credit unions offering afforda-
ble small-dollar loans. The NCUA could further encourage the devel-
opment of small-dollar loan programs by instituting a grant or subsidy 
program. Small dollar loan programs are sometimes offered at a loss 
to the credit union initially before the credit union can drive down 
costs and refer customers to higher-margin products. A grant or sub-
sidy program could off-set the initial loss and encourage more credit 
unions to develop small-dollar loan products. 
 b.  Employer sponsored small-dollar loans: a partnership between 
credit unions and employers. The Employer Sponsored Small-Dollar 
Loan Program is an employer-based, small-dollar loan product that was 
successfully tested by the Filene Research Institute to help credit unions 
provide affordable, financially sustainable products and services for their 
low- and moderate-income members.100 The program acts as a 
partnership between employers and credit unions. Specifically, employees 
are offered small-dollar loans of up to $2000, with terms of ninety days to 
one year and interest rates in the 15.99% to 17.99% range, which enables 
the product to be both affordable to the borrower and self-sustaining for 
the lender.101 The loans are underwritten based on the ability of the 
borrower to repay the loan, not on a credit score, and credit reports are 
pulled for informational purposes only.102 Employees are required to be a 
member of the credit union and to have worked for the employer for six 
to twelve months, depending on the agreement between the employer and 
the credit union.103 Employees repay the loan via payroll deduction on 
 
 97. FAQs, QCASH FIN., https://www.q-cash.com/faqs/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2018); Tele-
phone Interview with Jim Brown, supra note 96. 
 98. About QCash, supra note 96. 
 99. Id.; Telephone Interview with Jim Brown, supra note 96. 
 100. Feasibility Study Report Employer-Sponsored Small-Dollar Loan, 1 FILENE RES. 
INST. 24 (2017), https://filene.org/do-something/programs/employer-sponsored-small-dollar-
loans. 
 101. Id. at 5. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
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payday and are only able to take out one loan at a time.104 After the loan 
has been repaid, the automatic payroll deduction is continued by the 
employer, unless the employee opts out, and money that was previously 
used to repay the loan is put into a savings account for the employee.105 
Successful repayment of a loan is reported to the credit bureaus to 
establish or improve the borrower’s credit.106 Employers are required to 
pay a small sponsorship fee, based on the number of employees, which 
helps offset losses to the credit union from the program.107 
 c.  Examples of good credit union small-dollar loan programs. The 
North Carolina State Employees’ Credit Union, which is the second 
largest credit union in the country, offers its members a small-dollar loan 
in the form of a Salary Advance Loan. The North Carolina State 
Employees’ Credit Union serves North Carolina state and public-school 
employees and their families. To be eligible for the loan, members are 
required to have already set up direct deposit from their paycheck into 
their depository account. The loan can be up to $500 with an APR of 12%. 
The credit union added a forced savings component to the terms that 
requires 5% of each loan to be put into a savings account. The product is 
very profitable, with charge-offs of only 0.24%.108 Five years after the 
product’s inception in 2001, the product became the credit union’s most 
profitable product and the mandatory savings requirement generated $10 
million in new deposit funds.109 
NorthCountry Federal Credit Union in Burlington, Vermont pro-
vides an employer-based small-dollar loan in amounts up to $1000 to 
employees who have worked for the employer for at least one year, 
with an APR in the 15% to 18% range, and no credit check. North-
Country’s director of credit administration, Jeff Smith, was recently 
quoted in the Wall Street Journal saying “Part of what credit unions 
are founded to do is to provide small-dollar loans to people of limited 
means . . . We are breaking even with this program. It certainly 
achieves part of what we are founded to do.”110 To offer the product, 
 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Kenneth, supra note 4, at 697. 
 109. Kelly J. Noyes, Comment, Get Cash Until Payday! The Payday-Loan Problem in 
Wisconsin, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1627, 1677 (2006). 
 110. Yuka Hayashi, New Workplace Perk: Loans for Low-Income Employees, WALL ST. 
J. (Nov. 2, 2017, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-workplace-perk-loans-for-low-in-
come-employees-1509615001 (quoting Jeff Smith with North Country Federal Credit Union in 
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NorthCountry works with over thirty employers in Vermont with a 
combined 4700 employees.111 
The ASI Federal Credit Union in Louisiana offers the “Stretch 
Plan” “which offers a line of credit at 12% with a maximum amount of 
$500, or $1000 after the individual has successfully used the program 
for a period of time, and a $4 per week fee for membership in the 
plan.”112 The borrower must pay back the loan in two equal install-
ments starting on the second payday after the loan. This repayment 
term is designed to give the borrower more time to recover from the 
emergency that required immediate cash than the two weeks of the 
traditional payday loan. “The credit union made 8000 such loans in 
2004, with a charge-off rate of only 0.35% to 0.37%, and almost one-
third of the credit union’s operating income is from the program.”113 
A credit union’s senior management and board of directors are in-
strumental in the decision to launch small-dollar loan programs.114 
They must first identify a need for small-dollar loan products in the 
community they serve and then dedicate the credit union’s resources 
to launching and sustaining the product. Credit unions are governed 
by member-elected boards of directors.115 Credit-union members and 
consumer advocates can influence a credit union’s policy toward sup-
port for small-dollar loan products by electing onto the board candi-
dates who recognize the need within the membership for these prod-
ucts and are willing to devote resources to develop them.116 
B.  The Non-Profit Sector and Affordable Small-Dollar Loans 
The non-profit sector is an important part of the small-dollar loans 
solution to payday loans both because there is no pressure from share-
holders to return large profits and because non-profit organizations 
have deep connections to payday loan borrowers. Non-profit social 
service agencies are already on the front lines of helping low-income 
families—whether providing those families with affordable housing or 
 
Burlington, Vermont). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Kenneth, supra note 4, at 697. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Telephone Interview with Larry Garcia, supra note 32. 
 115. Wendy Cassity, Note, The Case for A Credit Union Community Reinvestment Act, 
100 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 355 n.152 (2000). 
 116. See also, Scheiber, supra note 9 (describing need to get low-paid workers as well as 
high-paid senior directors elected to the board of credit unions). 
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job training or small business coaching, to name just a few programs. 
The staff of non-profit organizations interact with their low-income 
clients frequently and understand the numerous challenges that they 
face. They also see and understand the financial harms done by payday 
lending. Perhaps most importantly, they have already earned the trust 
of their clients. The work of the non-profit sector is made harder by 
the financial burdens that payday loans create,117 which is what has 
driven some non-profit lenders to offer an alternative, affordable 
source of small-dollar credit to their clients. However, while non-
profit lenders are more likely than other lenders to have existing, 
healthy relationships with low- and moderate-income borrowers, they 
have a harder time accessing capital. Specifically, non-profit lenders 
must devote staff time to apply for grant money and low-interest loans 
from banks and foundations to fund loan capital, legal fees, regulatory-
compliance filing fees, and marketing expenses. Non-profit lenders, 
like for-profit fintech lenders, have more regulatory burdens than fi-
nancial institutions because they must comply with the different lend-
ing requirements in each state where they make loans. In contrast, fed-
eral credit unions must comply with only one set of regulations from 
the National Credit Union Administration, and federal banks have the 
right under the National Banking Act to choose one state’s lending 
laws to cover their lending activities in all fifty states. In addition, de-
spite their non-profit status, non-profit lenders must pay the same 
high market rates for marketing and for reporting their borrowers’ 
good credit to the three credit bureaus. 
1.  The Community Loan Center Affordable Small Dollar Loans 
Program 
The Community Loan Center Affordable Small Dollar Loans 
Program (“the CLC Program”) is an example of a financially self-sus-
taining, online, employer-based, small-dollar loan product offered by 
a network of non-profit lenders which makes a difference in the lives 
of many low- and moderate-income consumers. As of November 
2018, the CLC Program has loaned out almost $32 million in small-
dollar loans.118 
 
 117. See, e.g., Ann Baddour et al., Reshaping the Future of Small Dollar Lending in Texas: 
Alternatives to High-Cost Payday and Auto Title Loans, 1 TEX. APPLESEED 91, 21-23 (2012), 
https://www.texasappleseed.org/sites/default/files/15-PDL-Alternatives.pdf. 
 118. Email to Eliza Platts-Mills from Howard Porter, Program Manager, Community 
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The CLC Program was started after social justice consumer advo-
cates in Texas found that state-level legislative-reform efforts and bor-
rower education were ineffective in countering the harm done to work-
ing-class families by payday loans. Nick Mitchell-Bennett is the 
entrepreneurial Executive Director of the Community Development 
Corporation of Brownsville, a non-profit affordable-housing devel-
oper in Texas’s Rio Grande Valley, one of the poorest areas of the 
country.119 In 2010, Mr. Mitchell-Bennett and his colleagues in 
Brownsville were frustrated to see the low-income families that they 
were working with getting poorer despite the end of the recession.120 
They realized that a big part of the problem was payday loans.121 Mr. 
Mitchell-Bennett was on the verge of accepting a $25,000 grant from 
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, known as Freddie 
Mac, to launch a financial education marketing campaign called 
“Don’t Borrow Trouble” when someone asked him what families were 
supposed to do instead of taking out payday loans.122 Mr. Mitchell-
Bennett gave back the grant and launched the CLC Program, with fi-
nancial support from the Rio Grande Valley Multibank Corporation, 
a CDFI founded in 1995 by local investor stockholder banks; strategic 
support from consumer advocates across Texas including Ann Bad-
dour of Texas Appleseed, Woody Widrow of RAISE Texas, and Matt 
Hull of Texas Community Capital; and software support from a good 
friend. Along the way, the CLC Program has benefited from pro-bono 
legal support from the University of Texas School of Law’s Entrepre-
neurship and Community Development Clinic and strategic planning 
support from an Advisory Committee comprised of funders, consumer 
advocates, and lenders across Texas, including the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Dallas. Mr. Mitchell-Bennett also credits his extensive na-
tional network of non-profit-based social-justice advocates for the suc-
cess of the CLC Program.123 
 
Loan Center Affordable Small Dollar Loans Program, Texas Community Capital (Nov. 14, 
2018). 
 119. Elizabeth Duffrin, Thwarting Payday Lenders at the Texas Border, NACEDA (Apr. 
27,  2015),  http://www.naceda.org/index.php%3Foption%3Dcom_dailyplanetblog%26view%3 
Dentry%26category%3Dpeople-places%26id%3D6:thwarting-payday-lenders-at-the-texas-bo 
rder. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Telephone Interview with Nick Mitchell-Bennett, Community Loan Center of the 
Rio Grande Valley (May 22, 2018). 
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The CLC Program is an employer-based, online small-dollar loan 
program that operates through a network of non-profit local lenders 
and offers loans of up to $1000, repayable over a one-year term, at 18% 
interest, with a $20 administrative fee. The $20 administrative fee is 
financed into the loan for an APR of 21.73%. Borrowers may borrow 
up to $1000, capped at 50% of their take home monthly pay. Borrow-
ers are permitted to take out a subsequent loan only after they have 
paid back at least 50% of the original loan balance of their prior loan. 
Borrowers primarily repay the loan using either payroll deduction set 
up through their employer or an automatic electronic funds transfer 
from their bank account. The CLC Program is offered to employees 
of participating employers as a voluntary benefit of their employment, 
and all aspects of the loan program, from application to funding and 
repayment by the borrower, are done online using custom-built, 
cloud-based loan origination and servicing software. CLC lenders are 
required to offer free financial counseling to their borrowers, but bor-
rowers are not required to participate in financial counseling in order 
receive a CLC loan. 
The employers participating in the CLC Program do not have any 
financial responsibility for the loan. Their primary administrative re-
sponsibilities are limited to confirming that the borrower is an em-
ployee, and setting up payroll deduction when selected by the bor-
rower as the method of repayment. Employer-sponsored loan 
programs are offered to employees as a voluntary benefit. These      
programs keep costs down in two main ways: First, instead of incurring 
time and labor costs underwriting each borrower, the lender decides 
which employers to approach and essentially underwrites the              
employer. Second, while borrowers must be given the option to repay 
the loan by payroll deduction, electronic funds transfer, check, or cash, 
most borrowers choose payroll deduction, which helps to lower default 
rates.124 Employer-sponsored loan programs typically only register   
defaults from borrowers when the employee borrower leaves    
that employer.125 
 
 124. See Electronic Funds Transfer Act, Regulation E 12 C.F.R. § 205.10(e) (2017) (pro-
hibiting financial institutions or other lenders from conditioning receipt of a loan on repayment 
by preauthorized electronic funds transfers, except for credit extended under an overdraft credit 
plan). 
 125. Hayashi, supra note 110. 
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The CLC Program is a good example of a financially self-sustain-
ing small-dollar loan product with far less expensive terms than a pay-
day loan product. As of November 2018, the CLC Program had orig-
inated over 42,000 loans, totaling almost $32 million, with a charge-
off rate from January 2017 to November 2018 of 4.85%.126 When 
compared with average payday loan fees in Texas amounting to 500% 
APR, the CLC Program is estimated to have saved Texas borrowers 
almost $23 million. While the CLC Program does not collect house-
hold income data from borrowers at the time that they apply for the 
loan, a third-party non-profit organization conducted a voluntary, 
three-part online survey of CLC borrowers to collect demographic 
and other data.127 The data shows that the average CLC borrower re-
sembles the typical payday loan borrower.128 
The local lenders participating in the CLC Program are non-
profit, community-based organizations that have added the small-dol-
lar loan program to their affordable housing or small business support 
programs. Local lenders in the program are encouraged to raise 
$500,000 in start-up loan capital and administrative funds before they 
start lending, and the expectation is that the program will be financially 
self-sustaining for the local lenders within two years. The local lenders 
raise their operating and lending capital from banks and foundations, 
including through partnerships with local chapters of United Way and 
Goodwill. In addition, the CLC of the Rio Grande Valley and the 
CLC network coordinator, Texas Community Capital, have been suc-
cessful obtaining grants and low-interest loan capital from national 
foundations that they then make available to local lenders. Financial 
support has also come from the Citi Bank Foundation, Wells Fargo, 
the Opportunity Finance Network, the John D. and Catherine T. 
MacArthur Foundation, Prudential Financial, The Kresge Founda-
tion, the Kellogg Foundation, BBVA Compass, Mercy Partnership 
Fund, and Dignity Health Fund, among others. 
The CLC Program originated in Texas, a state that has done little 
to regulate payday lenders, that is home to some of the biggest and 
 
 126. Emails to Eliza Platts-Mills from Howard Porter, Program Manager, Community 
Loan Center Affordable Small Dollar Loans Program, Texas Community Capital, (Nov. 14 and 
16, 2018). 
 127. Yamanda Wright & Ann Baddour, Assessing Impacts of the Community Loan Center 
Affordable Small Dollar Loan Program on the Financial Well-Being of Borrowers, 1 TEXAS 
APPLESEED 34 (2017), https://www.texasappleseed.org/sites/default/files/Fair%20Loans%20an
d%20Family%20Finances.pdf. 
 128. Id. at 2-3. 
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most profitable payday loan corporations, and that has average payday 
loan APRs of 500% and higher. To date, the CLC Program has local 
lenders in eight metropolitan areas across Texas and also in Indiana, 
Maryland, Missouri, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Al-
abama, and Arizona. As discussed in Part V below, banks and founda-
tions should receive Community Reinvestment Act credit in exchange 
for extending affordable loan capital to local lenders in the CLC Pro-
gram, or banks could choose to become local lenders in the CLC pro-
gram themselves and help bring the program to scale through their 
own, direct lending. 
C.  The Fintech Sector and Affordable Small-Dollar Loans 
It has become common to read about technology entrepreneurs in 
Silicon Valley creating start-ups to tackle some of the country’s most 
intractable social problems, including income inequality and the need 
for small-dollar credit. Some of these high-tech financial service start-
ups, referred to as the “fintech sector,” are engaged in small-dollar 
lending directly to consumers, hoping to take market share away from 
payday lenders. Others are using technology and big data to create al-
ternative credit risk analysis to traditional credit reports, with the goal 
of obtaining a more detailed and accurate picture of a prospective bor-
rower’s ability to repay a loan. Yet another group of entrepreneurs uses 
search engine optimization tools to help borrowers counteract the 
huge, online presence of payday lenders. A fourth category of for-
profit companies engaged with alleviating the financial pressures fac-
ing low- and moderate-income households focuses on smoothing out 
the peaks and valleys of a person’s income, hoping to minimize the 
need for small-dollar credit altogether. 
Many big banks are providing financial support to the fintech sec-
tor. JP Morgan Chase’s philanthropic foundation has partnered with 
the non-profit Center for Financial Services Innovation to fund start-
ups through the Financial Solutions Lab, which holds an annual com-
petition to support innovative start-ups seeking to improve the finan-
cial health of low-income consumers. While the for-profit fintech sec-
tor has an easier time accessing start-up and loan capital than the non-
profit sector, the for-profit fintech sector must work hard to build trust 
with small-dollar borrowers and must have government checks in 
place, through federal and state regulators, to ensure that it keeps its 
promises to consumers. 
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1.  Fig Loans: offering transparent, consumer-friendly loans to help 
borrowers rebuild their credit and their financial health 
Fig Loans is a good example of a relatively new fintech company 
that is building a financially sustainable model for providing small-dol-
lar loans to low- and moderate-income consumers. Fig Loans was 
founded in 2015 by two Wharton business school graduates with the 
primary goal of helping low- and moderate-income families improve 
their financial health.129 The two founders, Jeff Zhou and John Li, soon 
understood that before low- and moderate-income families can im-
prove their credit histories and their financial health, those families 
need access to small-dollar loans less expensive than payday loans. To 
learn more about the problems with payday loans and to build trust 
with borrowers, Zhou and Li cold called non-profit organizations 
across the country to learn how their clients interacted with payday 
loans.130 United Way of Greater Houston was the most responsive 
non-profit. The interest from the United Way of Greater Houston, in 
addition to the prominent payday loan industry in Texas, led Fig Loans 
to start its lending in Houston. United Way of Greater Houston runs 
a collaborative named United Way THRIVE, in which nonprofit part-
ners, employers, financial institutions, local and state government 
agencies, and community colleges help low-income families achieve 
strong financial health through better skills and education, jobs, and 
financial habits.131  
In October 2015, Fig Loans launched its Fig Loan product, which 
offers borrowers loans of $300 to $750 repayable over four to six 
months in installment payments that include principal and all fees and 
interest. The highest total fees and interest charged by Fig Loans for 
a Fig Loan amounts to an APR of 190%, which was chosen to cover 
costs.132 Co-founder Zhou is quick to stress that a loan should be eval-
uated on more than its APR alone, pointing to these additional features 
of the Fig Loan product: Fig Loan extends its loan repayment due 
 
 129. Taylor Soper, Startup Spotlight: Fig Loans Offers Alternative to Payday Loans with 
More Long-term Benefits, GEEKWIRE (Apr. 28, 2016, 4:43 PM), https://www.geekwire.com/2 
016/fig-loans/. 
 130. Why Fig Loan Started in Houston, FIG LOANS, https://www.figloans.com/about/fig-
texas-story (last visited Nov. 8, 2018). 
 131. United Way THRIVE, UNITED WAY OF GREATER HOUS. (2018), https://www.unit-
edwayhouston.org/our-work/family-stability/united-way-thrive. 
 132. FIG LOANS, https://www.figloans.com/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2018). 
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dates without assessing any fees, reports to credit agencies to help fam-
ilies build good credit, gives financial education to borrowers during 
the relationship, and refuses to charge any other fees beyond the trans-
parent 190% flat fee.133  
Fig Loans attracts private investors with the potential of monetiz-
ing the proprietary underwriting algorithm that the company is devel-
oping.134 Rather than relying on traditional FICO credit scores or do-
ing labor-intensive, manual review of each applicant’s records, Fig 
Loans is developing an algorithm that looks at a digital copy of an ap-
plicant’s bank statements to determine whether an applicant can afford 
to pay back the loan and whether an applicant is likely to commit fraud. 
Zhou describes it as cash flow underwriting and claims that it will re-
sult in a more nuanced picture of the financial health of households 
whose FICO score falls below the industry standard of 600.135 
When asked about the appropriateness of a 190% flat fee, Zhou 
explains that the company started at 80% but realized they could not 
be profitable at that rate.136 He adds that the company would like to 
lend at 36% and that it hopes to bring down its interest rate after in-
creasing its loan volume and fully deploying its bank statement under-
writing algorithm.137 Zhou describes his top two expenses as bad debt 
and marketing expenses. With regard to bad debt, which he describes 
as the percentage of borrowers with no intention of repaying their 
loan, he hopes that his algorithm will enable the company to detect 
those borrowers ahead of time. With regard to marketing, he says the 
challenge is that marketing companies, like radio stations, Google, or 
newspapers, sell their space to the highest bidder, and traditional pay-
day lenders can outbid companies like Fig Loans and dominate these 
marketing outlets.138 Zhou hopes to be able to defray costs as the com-
pany grows and originates more loans. He is not surprised that rela-
tively few lenders have entered the market for small-dollar loans, both 
because of the negative stigma attached to the industry by payday lend-
ers and the high ongoing costs.139 
 
 133. Telephone Interview with Jeff Zhou, Co-Founder, Fig Loans (Apr. 10, 2018). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
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The founders of Fig Loans entered the small-dollar loan market 
with the goal of helping consumers improve their credit and their  
overall financial well-being.140 Fig Loans tries to differentiate itself 
from payday lenders in at least four ways. First, Fig Loan points out 
that its 190% flat fee is 60-70% less than the 400-500% APR typical 
in Texas.141 Second, the company administers its Fig Loan product in 
a transparent, consumer friendly way, including extending loan           
repayment deadlines for borrowers when needed without assessing any 
additional fees or additional interest. As a result, for borrowers for 
whom the loan repayment deadline is extended, with no additional fees 
or interest, the actual, effective APR on their Fig Loan is lower than 
190%.142 Third, unlike most payday lenders, Fig Loans incurs the cost 
of submitting reports to the three major credit bureaus so that           
borrowers who repay their Fig Loan on time will start to build good 
credit. Fourth, Fig Loans has partnered with non-profit                           
organizations, primarily the United Way of Greater Houston             
and Family Services of Greater Houston, with deep ties to low- and                                              
moderate-income borrowers. 
 Consumer advocates and regulators should look to for-profit lend-
ers like Fig Loans when trying to decide how to define best practices 
for small-dollar loans and which regulations to endorse. A regulation 
that caps all small-dollar loans at 36% would prevent a fintech like Fig 
Loans from entering the market. A higher interest rate, while still 
safely below the 400-500% APRs of payday lenders, would allow for 
more competition and more choice for consumers. 
2.  LendUp: a cautionary tale of the need for federal oversight 
LendUp, based in San Francisco, is a well-funded fintech small-
dollar lender that has drawn the attention of both venture-capital firms 
and regulators. Founded in 2012, the company offers online small-dol-
lar consumer loans to borrowers with low credit scores and has re-
cently started offering credit cards to those same borrowers, although 
it is likely to spin that business off.143 LendUp has received $325 mil-
 
 140. Philosophy, FIG LOANS, https://figloans.com/about/responsible-lending-model (last 
visited Nov. 8, 2018). 
 141. FIG LOANS, supra, note 132. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Mark Calvey, LendUp to Spilt in Two as Fin Tech Decides It Is Worth More in 
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lion in equity and debt financing from PayPal, Kleiner Perkins Cau-
field & Byers, Google Ventures, Andreessen Horowitz, and others.144 
The company offers borrowers online, single-payment loans of $100 
to $500, repayable in up to thirty days, and online installment loans of 
$100 to $1000, repayable over a longer term.145 A borrower’s exact loan 
terms vary by state and by a borrower’s credit history, which LendUp 
determines using traditional credit scores and a prospective borrower’s 
non-traditional credit history.146 LendUp’s business model includes a 
“LendUp Ladder” which enables borrowers in some states to access 
longer-term loans at rates under 36% APR, if they repay their first 
loans on time and take LendUp’s free education courses.147 For some 
of its loans, LendUp reports on-time repayments to credit bureaus to 
help borrowers establish or improve their credit.148  
A sample, single-payment loan on LendUp’s website shows $200 
borrowed, repayable in one payment in two-week’s time, with total in-
terest amounting to $35.20, or 458.86% APR.149 While the triple digit 
APRs on LendUp’s initial loans to borrowers are similar to the high 
interest rate and fees that borrowers are charged on payday loans, there 
are two key differences between LendUp and payday lenders. First, 
LendUp does not allow any rollovers, so its borrowers would never 
owe more than the interest included in the initial loan.150 Second, most 
LendUp borrowers who are able to repay their initial loan on time and 
complete a financial education course are able to move up the LendUp 
Ladder and earn access to longer-term, lower-interest loans.151 How-
ever, the initial interest rates on LendUp loans are very high. 
 
Pieces, S.F. BUS. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/news/2018/
10/19/lendup-split-fintech-credit-cards-subprime-loans.html (citing an anonymous source that 
says that offering a credit card requires working with a bank and banks do not want to partner 
with a company that is offering loans with payday-level interest rates). 
 144. See LendUp, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LendUp (last visited Nov. 17, 
2018). 
 145. LENDUP, https://www.lendup.com/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2018). 
 146. Our Take on the Payday Loan Industry, LENDUP, https://www.lendup.com/en/our-
take-on-payday (last visited Nov. 17, 2018). 
 147. Here’s how the LendUp Ladder works in California, LENDUP, https://www.lendup. 
com/ladder (last visited Nov. 24, 2018); Amrita Jayakumar, LendUp Loan 2018 Review, 
NERDWALLET (June 22, 2018), https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/loans/lendup-loan-review/. 
 148. Jayakumar, supra note 147. 
 149. LENDUP, supra note 145. 
 150. Our Take on the Payday Loan Industry, supra note 146. 
 151. See Jayakumar, supra note 147. 
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In 2016, LendUp made the news as the subject of an enforcement 
action by the federal Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), 
which found that the company was failing consumers on three fronts: 
(1) it was not decreasing the interest rate for some borrowers who re-
paid on time, despite promising to do so, (2) it had not been reporting 
all repayments to the credit bureaus, despite promising to do so, and 
(3) it had failed to clearly disclose some of its fees to borrowers.152 It is 
critical that federal and state enforcement agencies remain vigilant on 
behalf of consumers to ensure that lenders claiming to be providing a 
better small-dollar loan product to borrowers are in fact doing so. 
3.  Progreso Financiero/Oportun: an innovator and early leader in 
the affordable small-dollar loans market 
Oportun, previously known as Progreso Financiero, was an early 
leader and innovator in the affordable small-dollar loan market. The 
company is a mission-driven, for-profit CDFI that offers unsecured 
installment loans between $300 and $6000, with loan terms ranging 
from seven months to forty-two months, with payments due twice a 
month.153 Oportun uses its own credit-scoring system to determine a 
borrower’s credit history and interest rate, and reports loan repay-
ments to two major credit bureaus to help borrowers establish a tradi-
tional credit history.154 In January of 2017, the Center for Financial 
Services Innovation published the results of a study commissioned by 
Oportun measuring how much its borrowers were saving with an 
Oportun loan compared to a payday loan.155 The results indicate that, 
for the 814,471 borrowers who first took out an Oportun loan between 
 
 152. See CFPB Orders LendUp to Pay $3.63 Million for Failing to Deliver Promised Ben-
efits, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/abo 
ut-us/newsroom/lendup-enforcement-action/; see also Amrita Jayakumar, Payday Alternative 
LendUp Owes $6.3 Million for Misleading Borrowers, NERDWALLET (Sept. 27, 2016), 
https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/loans/lendup-settlement/ (describing refunds and penalties 
assessed by the CFPB and by the California state regulator). 
 153. OPORTUN, https://www.oportun.com/en/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2018). 
 154. See Our Story, OPORTUN, https://www.oportun.com/en/about/story/ (last visited 
Nov. 8, 2018). 
 155. Oportun: The Trust Cost of a Loan, 1 CTR. FOR FIN. SERVS. INNOVATION 17 (Jan. 
2017), https://www.oportun.com/studies/201701_CFSI_Oportun_Total_Cost_of_Loan_White 
paper.pdf. 
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October 2008 and December 2016 and who had annual household in-
comes of up to $50,000, the average borrower saved $1130 on her first 
loan, and collectively, Oportun borrowers saved $921 million.156 
Progreso Financiero originated its first loan in 2005 and started by 
providing small, unsecured loans to unbanked and underbanked His-
panics in Texas and California, whom it reached by setting up kiosks 
in grocery stores popular with Hispanic consumers. The company’s 
mission is to help Hispanic borrowers build credit histories so that they 
can access mainstream financial services.157 Since its first loan in 2005, 
the company has extended $5.4 billion dollars of credit to over 1.2 mil-
lion low- and moderate-income Hispanic borrowers in Arizona, Cali-
fornia, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, 
Nevada, Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin.158 
Oportun continues to create innovative, important financial ser-
vices products. In 2018, the company announced a product to coun-
teract the harm to consumers from banks’ overdraft fee charges: for 
customers who link a bank account to Oportun, the company will send 
the customer a text alert when the account drops below $100 and will 
offer a $100 cash advance repayable at no cost, unlike the deposit ad-
vances and overdraft fees at banks. The cash advance is paid back with 
zero interest when the customer replenishes her bank account.159 
4.  NerdWallet: guiding borrowers to the best loan options 
NerdWallet is a start-up based in California that is not offering 
financial products to consumers, but is instead providing consumers 
with objective, comparative information about a wide range of finan-
cial products including credit cards, insurance, mortgage loans, and 
personal and business loans.160 NerdWallet currently offers its online 
search services for free to steer borrowers looking for loans online 
 
 156. Id. 
 157. Luz Gomez, Progreso Financiero: A Case Study of Business Model Innovation, 1 
CDFI 6 (Jan. 2013), https://www.cdfifund.gov/Documents/(6)%20Pregreso%20Financiero%2
0-%20A%20Case%20Study%20of%20Business%20Model%20Innovation.pdf. 
 158. Our Story, supra note 154. 
 159. Kevin Wack, A $100 Cash Advance for Free? One Firm is Trying the Idea, AM. 
BANKER (Apr. 12, 2018, 6:05 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/a-100-cash-advance-
for-free-one-firm-is-trying-the-idea. 
 160. Ron Lieber, A Private Equity Alum’s Guide to Better Payday Lenders, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/30/your-money/at-nerdwallet-guide-to-bet-
ter-payday-lenders-james-zhang.html; NerdWallet, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
NerdWallet (last visited Nov. 8, 2018). 
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away from high-cost payday loans and towards more affordable lend-
ers. NerdWallet’s website includes easy-to-read articles about personal 
loans and includes a search engine that provides borrowers with a list 
of personal loan products in their geographic area and a description of 
the main features of those loans and the application process. The com-
pany carefully vets and researches lenders before including them on its 
website. NerdWallet also has a staff of financial experts who can be 
reached on the phone to answer questions and give tailored advice, and 
whose articles and opinions are carried by the national media.161 To 
date, the website only features personal loans of $1000 and higher. 
These small-dollar loans all feature APRs below 36%, loan terms of 
one to five years, quick processing time on loan applications, and some 
flexibility with underwriting—although most of the lenders require a 
minimum FICO score of 600.  
NerdWallet has also done advocacy work in New Jersey to shine 
light on state pension funds and university endowments that are in-
vesting in the payday loan industry through private equity.162  
5.  PayActiv, Flex Wage, and Activehours: helping borrowers access 
their income before payday 
Some fintech entrepreneurs are hoping to preempt the need for 
payday loans or small-dollar loans by enabling borrowers to access 
their monthly income when they need it, for a fee. These                        
entrepreneurs focus on the fact that the majority of payday loan         
borrowers turn to payday loans because they must pay their rent and 
their utilities towards the beginning of the month but do not get paid 
until the middle or the end of the month. Some employees already 
have the option to get paid daily because of the sector of the economy 
that they work in, including those who earn tips and those in the new 
gig economy, like drivers for Lyft and Uber. Some employees for 
larger, more traditional employers now also have the option to take 
home wages when they are earned rather than waiting for payday, 
thanks to these new fintech companies. 
 
 161. See, e.g., Amrita Jayakumar, Payday Loan Alternative LendUp to Pay $6.3 Million 
for Misleading Customers, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR (Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.csmonitor. 
com/Business/Saving-Money/2016/0930/Payday-loan-alternative-LendUp-to-pay-6.3-million-
for-misleading-customers (describing the CFPB’s settlement with LendUp and encouraging bor-
rowers to look for cheaper forms of credit). 
 162. Lieber, supra note 160. 
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PayActiv, based in San Jose, California, and Flex Wage, based in 
Mountainside, New Jersey, are examples of technology start-ups which 
enable participating employers to offer their employees real-time ac-
cess to their earned but unpaid wages through an ATM at their work-
place.163 The start-ups charge employees $3 to $5 per transaction, and 
some employers, including Goodwill, cover some of that cost for their 
employees. PayActiv uses its own cash to fund the employee withdraw-
als and then recovers that money back from the employer on payday. 
Flex Wage moves the cash advance directly from the employer to the 
employee and has recently partnered with ADP, a large payroll services 
company, hoping to attract more employers to participate. Other start-
ups, including Palo Alto-based Activehours, market their technology 
directly to employees, giving them the opportunity to withdraw their 
wages before payday in exchange for giving Activehours access to their 
checking account on payday. Instead of charging a set fee per transac-
tion, Activehours allows employees to pay how much they think the 
service is worth to them. 
While the much better solution would be for employers to pay a 
living wage and give employees sufficient hours, a short-term fix may 
be to enable employees to access their wages as they are earned rather 
than at the end of a pay period. 
D.  The U.S. Postal Service and Affordable Small-Dollar Loans 
One potentially significant small-dollar loan proposal is for the 
United States Postal Service, with its extensive network of brick and 
mortar locations and its large number of postal customers, to offer af-
fordable small-dollar loans, in addition to low-cost checking and sav-
ings accounts. The U.S. Postal Service already has the physical infra-
structure in place to reach a large number of customers and is a 
familiar, trustworthy presence in every community. The idea of a pub-
lic small-dollar loan program has been endorsed by Elizabeth Warren, 
Bernie Sanders, and other consumer advocates.164 The Postal Banking 
Act was introduced on April 25, 2018 by Senator Kirsten Gillibrand 
 
 163. Stacy Cowley, New Payday Options for Making Ends Meet, N.Y. TIMES (July 4, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/05/business/dealbook/new-payday-options-for-mak-
ing-endsmeet.html. 
 164. Daniel Marans, Kirsten Gillibrand Unveils a Public Option for Banking,  HUFFING- 
TON  POST  (Apr.  25,  2018),  https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/kirstengillibrand-postal-
banking-bill_us_5ae07f9fe4b07be4d4c6feae?ncid=engmodushpmg00000004. 
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and includes both low-cost checking and savings accounts and also 
low-interest small-dollar loans.165 The bill provides for small-dollar 
loans of up to $500, with individuals limited to borrowing a total of 
$1000 over one year, and with an interest rate slightly higher than the 
yield on one-month Treasury bonds, which is currently around 1.65%. 
The Postal Service’s Inspector General report from 2014 suggested it 
would need interest rates closer to 28% to account for loan defaults 
and suggested limiting loan amounts to 50% of a borrower’s gross 
paycheck.166 Other countries’ postal services successfully provide fi-
nancial services to customers.167 
Postal banking is not new to the United States. From 1911 to 1967, 
the United States Postal Savings Service (USPSS) operated savings ac-
counts across the country with an interest rate capped at 2.25-2.5%, to 
keep the postal banks from taking customers away from private 
banks.168 At its peak in 1947, the system of postal banks in the United 
States had $3.4 billion in deposits and four million users at post offices 
across the country.169 In addition to offering consumers a much more 
affordable alternative to payday loans, reinstating postal banking could 
also provide a steady and needed source of income for the postal ser-
vice, an independent federal agency that relies on the sale of services 
to cover its expenses.170 The Postal Service’s Inspector General’s Of-
fice estimates that the Service could earn as much as $8.9 billion a year 
if it entered the small-dollar, short-term loan business.171 
As Professor Mehrsa Baradaran writes, the postal savings account 
system in the United States was terminated when banks, which could 
offer higher interest rates, had branches within easy reach of 
most Americans: 
In 1946, 68 percent of the nation’s towns and cities had both postal 
savings depositories and banks. And because banks could charge 
higher interest than the post office and were just as safe, the USPSS 
was no longer an attractive option for deposits. This is no longer true 
today as banks have been squeezed on all sides by money markets, 
 
 165. Postal Banking Act, S. 2755, 115th Cong. (2018). 
 166. Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Postal Serv., Providing Non-Bank Financial Services 
for the Underserved 13 (2014). 
 167. Id. at 25, app. C. 
 168. Id. at 8, 22, app. A. 
 169. Id. at 8, 23, app. A. 
 170. Id. at 16. 
 171. Id. 
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capital markets, and foreign banks. Banks began to abandon poor ar-
eas and post offices remained, but without banking services. And 
once banks deserted low-income neighborhoods starting in the 
1970s, the high-cost payday lenders and check-cashers flooded in.172  
Reinstating postal checking and savings accounts and introduc-
ing postal, low-interest small-dollar loans could make much needed fi-
nancial services available to all Americans at a much more                        
affordable price. 
V.  AFFORDABLE SMALL-DOLLAR LOAN PROGRAMS NEED 
FINANCIAL AND REGULATORY SUPPORT AND SUPPORT FROM 
CONSUMER ADVOCATES 
The affordable small-dollar loan programs described in Part IV 
need support from federal regulators, the financial sector, and con-
sumer advocates. Part V describes the specific support that is needed. 
First, the federal regulators of banks and credit unions should continue 
their recent support for these institutions offering small-dollar loans at 
rates far below those of payday lenders. Second, the CRA should be 
interpreted to penalize banks participating in and supporting the pay-
day loan industry and endorse banks participating in and supporting 
affordable small-dollar loan programs. Third, banks and foundations 
must continue to provide financial support to small-dollar loan pro-
grams offered by CDFI and non-profit lenders. Fourth, the Internal 
Revenue Service and the courts should put pressure on tax-exempt 
credit unions to provide small-dollar loan products. Finally, marketing 
companies should help small-dollar loan programs tell consumers 
about the more affordable alternatives to payday loans. 
A.  Critical Ongoing Role for Federal Regulators in Supporting 
Affordable Small-Dollar Loans 
The CFPB needs to continue to take the lead in providing clear 
guidance to all lenders on appropriate features for small-dollar loans. 
The CFPB is forbidden from regulating interest rates by its enabling 
legislation, the Dodd-Frank Act. However, it can and has drafted a 
 
 172. Mehrsa Baradaran, A Short History of Postal Banking, SLATE (Aug. 18, 2014, 1:51 
PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/history/2014/08/postal_banking_already
_worked_in_the_usa_and_it_will_work_again.html; see also OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra 
note 166, at 5. 
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Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High Cost Installment Loans Rule 
that regulates other features of payday loans and that in its current 
form helps to make the market for small-dollar loans more competitive 
by encouraging banks and credit unions to enter the market with rea-
sonably priced loans.173 
In addition, the OCC and NCUA should be applauded for their 
recent small-dollar loan guidance, and other prudential banking regu-
lators should follow their lead.174 As discussed above, banks and credit 
unions are the obvious players to provide small-dollar loans because 
they are already in the business of lending and already have payday 
loan borrowers as customers since a checking account is a prerequisite 
for obtaining a payday loan.175 And yet, to date, neither banks nor 
credit unions have entered the market for small-dollar loans in signif-
icant numbers, in part because they need more clarity from their reg-
ulators. To give real choice to low- and moderate-income borrowers 
in need of immediate small-dollar credit, the market for small-dollar 
loans needs to become more competitive with payday lenders facing 
competition from banks, credit unions, non-profit lenders, and fintech 
lenders combined. The FDIC and the Federal Reserve should follow 
the lead of the OCC and NCUA and provide clear guidance on small-
dollar loans to enable the financial institutions that they supervise to 
enter the small-dollar loan market. Guidance should include limits on 
the number of rollovers or the ability of borrowers to have multiple 
loans simultaneously, a requirement that banks timely report repay-
ment history to the three major credit bureaus, credit underwriting 
that looks at a borrower’s ability to repay, and a requirement that the 
loans carry affordable monthly payments of no more than 5% of a bor-
rower’s monthly income.176 
 
 173. Final Rule: Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/policy-compliance/rule-
making/final-rules/payday-vehicle-title-and-certain-high-cost-installment-loans/ (last visited 
Nov. 17, 2018); see also, Bourke, Momentum Is Building for Small Dollar Loans, supra note 65. 
 174. See supra part IV.A.1.e. 
 175. See supra part IV.A. 
 176. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 63; see also Bourke, How CFPB 
Rules Can Encourage Banks, supra note 43. 
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B.  Community Reinvestment Act Examiners Should Encourage 
Banks to Fund Affordable Small-Dollar Loans 
Banks are also subject to the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), 
and the federal prudential banking regulators responsible for inter-
preting and enforcing the CRA should do so in a way that supports 
small-dollar loan programs. Federally insured banks are heavily in-
volved in the payday loan industry. They provide capital to payday 
lenders and collect overdraft “protection” fees from account holders 
who have insufficient funds in their accounts, fees that resemble the 
predatory fees charged by payday lenders.177 CRA examiners should 
penalize these harmful practices and actively encourage banks to assist 
small-dollar loan programs, including giving banks CRA credit for 
capital invested in affordable small-dollar loan programs.178 
The CRA is a 1977 federal law with a central goal of encouraging 
commercial banks and savings associations to meet the credit needs—
not just the depository needs—of the community the institution serves, 
including low- and moderate-income households and neighborhoods, 
while also maintaining the sound operation of the institution.179 The 
CRA covers banks and savings associations, including both national 
and state banks, whose deposits are insured by the FDIC. In passing 
the CRA, Congress expressed concern that individuals who were de-
positing their money with banks were not being served by those same 
banks when it came to lending and that banks were redlining certain 
neighborhoods by designating neighborhoods or housing located in 
certain neighborhoods and refusing to extend credit to those areas.180 
 
 177. Peter Rudegeair et al., Banks Take Hidden Subprime Path, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 11, 
2018), at B1 (describing the $1.4 billion that Wells Fargo and Citigroup have given to payday 
lender Exeter Finance, LLC for its auto title lending, and the $345 billion that banks lent to 
Exeter and other nonbank financial firms in 2017); Low, supra note 55 (estimating that banks 
and credit unions collected $15 billion in overdraft and bounced check fees in 2016, based on 
filings showing that banks with over $1 billion in assets collected a total of $11.41 billion in over-
draft and bounced check fees in 2016, and reporting that the average overdraft amount is just 
over $20 and the average overdraft “protection” fee is $34). 
 178. See generally, Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, The CRA Implications of 
Predatory Lending, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1571 (2002) (recommending that the CRA be en-
forced to penalize covered banks that participate in predatory lending in low- and moderate-
income neighborhoods); see also Financial Institution Letter, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2007/fil07006a.html (last updated Jan. 22, 2007) 
(stating that “[p]redatory lending can have a negative effect on a bank’s CRA performance . . . 
[F]inancial institutions are expected to help meet the credit needs of their entire communities, 
including low- and moderate-income areas.”). 
 179. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2901 (West 2009). 
 180. Darryl E. Getter, The Effectiveness of the Community Reinvestment Act, 1 CONG. 
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The CRA is enforced by the Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency, the Federal Reserve System, and the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation through annual CRA examinations of covered financial 
institutions.181 Covered financial institutions are evaluated based on 
three tests: the lending test, the investment test, and the services test. 
The lending test applies to small, intermediate, and large banks. The 
investment test applies to medium and large banks. The services test 
only applies to large banks. The lending test, which examines how fre-
quently different income groups receive loans, is the only test that ap-
plies to all types of covered banks and is also the test that receives the 
most weight. The services test, which evaluates the availability and ef-
fectiveness of a bank’s retail banking services, including loan produc-
tion offices in low-income neighborhoods, has largely not put banks 
under substantial pressure.182 If a bank receives a favorable rating, then 
it will be evaluated less frequently. The results of CRA examinations 
may be taken into consideration by these same agencies when consid-
ering applications by those institutions for new bank branches or for 
mergers and acquisitions. An agency may use a poor CRA rating to 
reject a bank’s application to expand its business or merge with another 
bank.183 As a result of these incentives, “the rating system can help push 
banks into, or away from, certain activities.”184 
Under the CRA, “regulated financial institutions have continuing 
and affirmative obligation [sic] to help meet the credit needs of the 
local communities in which they are chartered.”185 To bring payday 
lending into the CRA framework, regulators need to determine that 
 
RES. SERV. 22 (Jan. 7, 2015), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/outreach-and-
education/cra/reports/CRS-The-Effectiveness-of-the-Community-Reinvestment-Act.pdf. 
 181. The Federal Reserve regulates state-chartered banks that are members of the Federal 
Reserve System. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) regulates state-chartered 
banks and saving banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System. The Office of the 
Comptroller of Currency (OCC) regulates national banks. John Meeks, An Introduction to the 
Community Reinvestment Act, 1 FDIC CMTY. AFF. 60, 7-8, https://www.richmond-
fed.org/~/media/richmondfedorg/conferences_and_events/community_development/2012/cra_ 
intro_050212.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2018). 
 182. Michael S. Barr, Access to Financial Services in the 21st Century: Five Opportunities 
for the Bush Administration and the 107th Congress, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. 
POL’Y 447, 452 nn.7–8 (2002). 
 183. Pearl Chin, Payday Loans: The Case for Federal Legislation, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 
723, 750 (2004). 
 184. Kenneth, supra note 4, at 695. 
 185. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2901 (West 2009). 
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banks located in communities affected by payday lending have a “con-
tinuing and affirmative obligation” to meet the need for affordable 
small-dollar loans in those communities.186 
The CRA can potentially serve as both a mechanism to penalize 
banks for involvement with the payday loan industry187 and an incen-
tive for banks to offer or help others to offer affordable small-dollar 
loans.188 Affordable small-dollar loan programs that include best prac-
tice features should fit squarely within the CRA, since they are provid-
ing a much-needed alternative to low- and moderate-income house-
holds who would otherwise resort to payday loans. In fact, the 
guidelines for affordable small-dollar loans issued as a result of the 
FDIC pilot program note that “Institutions that provide such [afford-
able small-dollar loan] products consistent with these guidelines will 
receive favorable CRA consideration as outlined in the CRA section 
below.”189 Favorable CRA consideration can be a valuable incentive for 
banks to enter the small-dollar loan market.190 To determine which 
affordable small-dollar loan programs meet the goals of the CRA, reg-
ulators could start by looking to the FDIC’s own small-dollar loan 
template, described above in Part IV.A. The salient features of that 
template are an APR of 36% or less, a loan term of ninety days or 
greater, and a loan decision within twenty-four hours of the borrower’s 
application. Regulators could also consider extending favorable CRA 
consideration to institutions that offer affordable small-dollar loans 
with APRs above 36% but with monthly loan payments that do not 
exceed 5% of the borrower’s monthly income.191 
Another area of consideration is expanding the coverage of the 
CRA to include credit unions. Credit unions were not included in the 
 
 186. Benjamin D. Faller, Payday Loan Solutions: Slaying the Hydra (and Keeping it Dead), 
59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 125, 159 (2008). 
 187. See, e.g., Barr, supra note 182, at 462 (“To the extent that federally-regulated financial 
institutions are involved, regulators should pay particular attention to the problem of repeated 
refinancings [in payday lending]. In addition, as noted above, greater attention to the CRA ser-
vices test could help shed light on bank practices in this area.”). 
 188. See, e.g., Chin, supra note 183, at 750 (“Partnerships with payday lenders should be a 
factor that lowers a bank’s CRA score.”); Faller, supra note 186, at 159 (“If banks offer appropri-
ate [small-dollar loan] products, they should receive positive credit, as with the FDIC guidelines. 
If banks fail to meet the need, or offer inappropriate products, they ought to be penalized with 
negative evaluations of their practices.”). 
 189. Financial Institution Letter, supra note 178. 
 190. Faller, supra note 186, at 156. 
 191. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 63; see also Bourke, How CFPB Rules 
Can Encourage Banks, supra note 43. 
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CRA because, at the time of drafting, it was argued that they lacked 
the ability and incentive to engage in the practices by financial institu-
tions that inspired the CRA. Credit unions were not-for-profit, rela-
tively small in size, and limited to serving people of a common com-
munity.192 Credit unions, however, have changed dramatically since 
the passage of the CRA and now engage in business practices similar 
to those that banks engaged in when the CRA was enacted, with some 
even offering products comparable to payday loans.193 As such, it may 
be appropriate to include credit unions within the coverage of the CRA 
and subject them to similar incentives.194 In the alternative, credit un-
ion regulators, such as the National Credit Union Administration 
(NCUA) can push credit unions to honor their commitment to the 
communities they serve. The NCUA has moved in that direction in 
pressuring credit unions to obtain Community Development Financial 
Institution designation from the Department of the Treasury.195 
C.  Financial Institutions, Foundations, and Private Investors Should 
Continue to Provide Affordable Loan Capital and Loan Loss Reserve 
Funds for Affordable Small-Dollar Loan Programs 
Financial institutions, foundations, and private investors have a 
critical role to play in providing the initial and ongoing loan capital 
and loan-loss reserve funds needed to bring affordable small-dollar 
loan programs to market. As explained earlier, most banks are cur-
rently unwilling to enter the small-dollar loan program directly, citing 
the difficulty in making profits on unsecured loans below $1000. For 
banks not willing to originate small-dollar loans themselves, they can 
instead help by lending affordable loan capital and loan loss reserve 
funds to other start-up and existing affordable small-dollar lenders. 
This loan capital can be extended because it is the right thing to do, 
because the borrowers it benefits may one day become the bank’s cus-
tomers for mortgages and other mainstream financial products, and 
because banks can obtain valuable CRA credit in return. 
 
 192. Cassity, supra note 115, at 338. 
 193. Id. at 334. 
 194. See e.g., Community Reinvestment Reform Act of 2018, S. 3503, 115th Cong. (2017-
18) (proposed by Senator Elizabeth Warren) (including an expansion of the CRA to cover 
credit unions). 
 195. Telephone Interview with Aaron Duffy, supra note 83. 
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Banks, governments, and foundations can and should provide af-
fordable loan capital to non-profit, small-dollar loan programs. The 
prestigious, annual NEXT Opportunity Award, which is a partnership 
of Wells Fargo, the Opportunity Finance Network, The John D. and 
Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, The Kresge Foundation, and 
Prudential, has focused for two years in a row on innovative consumer 
financial services delivered by the CDFI sector. The CDFI sector in-
cludes non-profit and for-profit organizations that have obtained the 
CDFI designation from the U.S. Department of Treasury. 
With 57% of Americans struggling with financial health, and a grow-
ing number of households turning to high-cost alternative financial 
products and services, CDFIs are needed more than ever to expand 
their role and provide this market with affordable and responsible 
products. . . . With 2016 financial support from Wells Fargo and 
Prudential, the 2016 NEXT Awards will continue a second year de-
voted to consumer financial services to build the critical momentum 
and visibility for CDFIs in this space. Consumer financial services 
includes loan products—small-dollar personal loans, credit building 
loans, auto loans, mortgage loans, and other loans for individual con-
sumers—as well as other financial services such as savings products, 
debit and checking products, and financial education.” 196  
Financial institutions may also have an important role as direct 
lenders in the non-profit small-dollar loan programs described in Part 
IV. Once the non-profit small-dollar lenders have done the hard work 
of designing, implementing, and proving a financially self-sustaining, 
affordable small-dollar loan program, financial institutions should be 
encouraged to join or take over these innovative small-dollar loan pro-
grams and bring them to scale.197 Banks and credit unions are already 
in the business of lending, have an existing pool of borrowers who hold 
checking and savings accounts with them, have access to large amounts 
of loan capital, have a regional and national presence, and could 
 
 196. Press Release, Wells Fargo NEXT Awards for Opportunity Finance, https://ofn.org/ 
sites/default/files/resources/PDFs/2016%20NEXTAwards%20Flyer.pdf. (last visited Nov. 8, 
2018). The two 2016 NEXT Opportunity Awardees are small-dollar lenders mentioned in this 
paper: The Community Loan Center Affordable Small Dollar Loans Program and the Appala-
chian Community Federal Credit Union. See NEXT AWARDS, http://nextawards.org/ (last visited 
Dec. 22, 2018). 
 197. See e.g., Allison Daminger et al., Driving Positive Innovations to Scale in the Financial 
Services Sector, 1 IDEAS 42, 31 (2014), https://www.ideas42.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/05/D 
riving-Positive-Innovations-to-Scale-in-the-Financial-Services-Sector-August-Final.pdf (descri 
bing challenges to bringing financial services innovations to scale and including specific recom-
mendations for how to overcome these challenges). 
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quickly expand a successful small-dollar loan program to scale. By tak-
ing these programs to scale, financial institutions would capture the 
large volume that is necessary to make a profit on small-dollar loans 
with affordable interest rates and fees, take market share away from 
payday lenders, and make a real difference in the lives of low- and mod-
erate-income families. 
D.  The Internal Revenue Service and the Courts Should Put 
Pressure on Credit Unions to Provide Affordable Small-Dollar Loans 
Credit unions are not currently covered by the CRA and do not 
need to worry about passing that annual test. However, as tax-exempt 
entities, credit unions have a charitable purpose that should include 
providing small-dollar loans, especially given the finding that 20% of 
credit union members have taken out a payday loan. The federal and 
state agencies that oversee tax-exempt entities, and the federal and 
state agencies that oversee credit unions, should put pressure on credit 
unions to provide affordable small-dollar loans, including, but not lim-
ited to, the PAL Product and the Employer Sponsored Small-Dollar 
Loans Product discussed in Part IV. 
Credit unions offer similar financial services and products to 
banks, but they differ in at least one, significant way: credit unions have 
the potential to be exempt from federal income taxes. IRS enforcement 
of credit union tax exemption can provide a mechanism for reining in 
high fees collected by credit unions and encouraging credit unions to 
offer affordable small-dollar loans. 
Federal credit unions are automatically tax exempt under 501(c)(1) 
of the Internal Revenue Code, as long as they meet the requirements 
set forth in the Federal Credit Union Act, including the interest rate 
cap of 15% subject to adjustment by the NCUA.198 State credit unions 
obtain their tax exemption under Section 501(c)(14)(A) of the Internal 
Revenue Code.199 State credit unions, however, are not subject to the 
interest rate cap in the Federal Credit Union Act, but the interest rate 
caps, or lack of, in the state in which they are incorporated.  
 
 198. See Federal Credit Union Act of 1934, as amended by 12 U.S.C. § 1768; see also 12 
U.S.C. § 1757(5)(A)(vi)(I) (establishing an interest rate cap for federal credit unions of 15% sub-
ject to adjustment by the Board of the NCUA); 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(1) (2012) (exempting corpo-
rations established by federal law as tax-exempt instrumentalities of the United States). 
 199. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(14)(A) (2012). 
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For state credit unions, Section 511 of the Internal Revenue Code 
imposes a tax on the “unrelated business taxable income” (UBTI) of 
organizations otherwise exempt from federal income tax under Section 
501(c)(14)(A).200 Section 512(a)(1) defines UBTI as “the gross income 
derived by any organization from any unrelated trade or business (as 
defined in section 513) regularly carried on by it.”201 Section 513(a) 
adds that an “unrelated trade or business” is “any trade or business the 
conduct of which is not substantially related . . . to the exercise or per-
formance by such organization of its charitable, educational, or other 
purpose or function constituting the basis for its exemption.”202 One 
of the primary reasons behind Congressional enactment of the UBIT 
provisions was to prohibit unfair competition by tax-exempt entities 
against taxable entities.203 
The IRS has issued guidance explaining that for a credit un-
ion’s activities to escape taxation as UBTI, the activities “must contrib-
ute directly and importantly to the accomplishment of one or more 
of [the credit union]’s exempt purposes—promotion of thrift 
and providing low cost credit for its members through mutual 
and nonprofit operation.”204 Federal courts have used a similar defini-
tion of a credit union’s exempt purpose. In Alabama Central Credit 
Union v. United States, the district court explained that a credit un-
ion’s exempt purposes “are to: (1) promote thrift among its members; 
and (2) create a source of credit for its members at legitimate rates of 
interest.”205 Likewise, the district court in Community First 
Credit Union v. United States explained that the tax-exempt purposes 
of a credit union ”include encouraging thrift, providing fair credit, and 
providing an opportunity for members to improve their social 
and economic conditions.”206 
The language used to describe a credit union’s exempt purpose—
with its emphasis on the promotion of thrift, provision of fair credit, 
and improvement of social and economic conditions—can be read to 
exclude loans and overdraft fees with effective APR’s similar to payday 
 
 200. Id. § 511. 
 201. Id. § 512(a)(1). 
 202. Id. § 513(a). 
 203. See Mueller Co. v. Commissioner, 479 F.2d 678, 682 n.7 (3d Cir. 1973). 
 204. TECH. ADVICE MEMORANDUM FROM THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAM 
200709072, (2007). 
 205. Ala. Cent. Credit Union v. United States, 646 F. Supp. 1199, 1201 (N.D. Ala. 1986). 
 206. Cmty. First Credit Union v. United States, No. 08-c-57, 2009 WL 2058476, at *1 
(E.D. Wis. July 14, 2009). 
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loans. Under such an interpretation, credit union income from those 
loans and fees would be taxed. Affordable small-dollar loans offered by 
credit unions, on the other hand, further credit unions’ exempt pur-
pose and should be tax exempt. Accordingly, credit unions can obtain 
tax exemption on “the provision of savings accounts and loans to mem-
bers who might not be served by banks in a nonprofit and mutual man-
ner.”207 In fact, the IRS writes in an explanation of 501(c)(14)(A) that 
“a major reason for the establishment of credit unions in this country 
was to provide their members with a source of personal loans, in small 
amounts and for a short term, which generally were difficult to ob-
tain from other financial institutions, absent the payment of usurious 
interest rates.”208 
In application, courts have been permissive in their interpretation 
of the credit union activities that are substantially related to the exempt 
function.209 Nonetheless, the potential exists for the IRS to use UBTI 
to tax income to credit unions from expensive loans and overdraft fees. 
E.  Marketing Companies Should Help Borrowers Learn About 
Affordable Small-Dollar Loans 
In May of 2016, Facebook and Google announced that they would 
no longer accept advertising dollars from payday lenders.210 Google’s 
advertising policy states that it will not advertise personal loans with 
repayment in full due in less than sixty days or personal loans with an 
 
 207. John V. Woodhull & Janice M. Smith, Tax-Exempt Credit Unions – Why is Their 
Tax Status So Controversial?, TAX’N OF EXEMPTS, 26, 29 (2014). 
 208. STATE CHARTERED CREDIT UNION UNDER 501(C)(14)(A), 1979 IRS EXEMPT 
ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION (1979). 
 209. See Beelco Credit Union v. United States, 735 F. Supp. 2d 1286 (D. Colo. 2010) 
(holding that income from the sale of life and disability insurance was not subject to UBTI be-
cause it was substantially related to the credit union’s exempt purpose); Cmty. First Credit Union, 
2009 WL 2058476 (jury finding that the sale of life, disability, and automobile insurance was not 
subject to UBTI); see also, INTERNAL REVENUE SER., TAX EXEMPT AND GOV’T 
ENTITIES  DIV.,  CONTROL  NO:  TEGE-04-0324-0005,  MEMORANDUM  TO  ALL  EXEMPT 
ORGS.  EMPS.  (2015),  https://www.irs.gov/pub/foia/ig/spder/TEGE-04-0314-0005%5B1%5D 
.pdf (stating that federal credit unions are not subject to UBIT and that state-chartered credit 
unions are subject to UBIT but the income from the sale of a delineated number of products is 
not subject to UBIT, including interest from credit card loans, debit card program’s interchange 
fees, and credit card program’s interchange fees). 
 210. Andrea Peterson & Jonnelle Marte, Google to Ban Payday Loan Advertisements, 
WASH. POST (May 11, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theswitch/wp/2016/05/1
1/google-to-ban-payday-loan-advertisements/?utm_term=.c0f1065519ba. 
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APR at or greater than 36%.211 The impact of these new policies could 
be quite large since payday lenders reach a large number of their bor-
rowers through online advertising, part of which attracts borrowers to 
brick and mortar payday loan storefronts and part of which attracts 
borrowers to payday loans offered online. Critics claim that the com-
panies are not adequately enforcing their advertising policies and that 
payday lenders are continuing to advertise on these platforms.212 While 
enforcement remains critical, the private sector should be applauded 
for stepping in voluntarily to regulate these harmful financial products. 
The private sector could go one step further and advertise the 
small-dollar loan programs described in Part IV, especially since mar-
keting costs are such a high cost to small-dollar lenders.213 NerdWallet 
is doing just that and is doing it well. NerdWallet’s website includes 
easy-to-read information about small-dollar loans and includes a 
search engine that provides borrowers with a list of affordable small-
dollar loan products in their geographic area. The company carefully 
vets small-dollar lenders before including them on its website. Nerd-
Wallet has a team of researchers and writers who are engaged in na-
tional and local conversations about payday loans. Since high market-
ing costs are one of the factors that make it hard to offer an affordable 
small-dollar loan, subsidized marketing fees for affordable small-dollar 
loans would help alternative small-dollar lenders gain ground on pay-
day lenders.214 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The failure of monthly income to keep up with monthly expenses 
for a huge number of low- and moderate-income American households 
is a critical social issue. Payday loans are part of the challenge for low- 
and moderate-income households in America. Focusing on market al-
ternatives that offer truly affordable access to credit is worthwhile. 
 
 211. Financial Products and Services, GOOGLE SUPPORT, https://support.google.com/ad-
wordspolicy/answer/2464998?hl=en (last visited Nov. 8, 2018). 
 212. Kevin Wack, Payday Lenders are Finding Ways Around Google’s Ad Ban, AM. 
BANKER (Oct. 11, 2017, 12:39 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/payday-lenders-
are-finding-ways-around-googles-ad-ban. 
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Affordable small-dollar loan programs have been growing over the 
past ten years, started by financial institutions, by non-profit organiza-
tions, and by the fintech sector. The public and private sectors should 
continue to lend their financial support to these affordable small-dollar 
loan programs because these programs are helping consumers, are fi-
nancially sustainable, and need to be brought to scale. Federal regula-
tors should continue to support the provision of small-dollar loans by 
banks and credit unions. Consumer advocates should continue to sup-
port affordable alternatives and should consider whether the 36% cap 
is high enough to bring alternatives to scale. Working together, the 
public and private sectors can help give low- and moderate-income 
Americans the affordable credit they need and save them from the se-
rious harms of payday loans. 
